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THE EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER BY THE

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ

t

I. INTRODUCTION

DURING

THE LAST DECADE, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) has dramatically
expanded its use of supervisory power as a basis for decision.'
Courts in general have employed supervisory power in a broad
range of cases. For example, the Supreme Court has used its
supervisory power over lower federal courts to further the "fair
administration of justice" by excluding various types of tainted
evidence, 2 establishing rules for the composition of federal juries,3
t United States District Judge, District of Delaware. B.S. 1952, LL.B. 1955,
Univ. of Pennsylvania. LL.M. 1982, Univ. of Virginia. Inasmuch as the principal focus of this paper is the use of supervisory power by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, it must be remembered that the District of Delaware is
within the Third Circuit. Moreover, in two of the cases discussed in the text,
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1981),
and Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923
(1980), the author was the district judge whose decision was under review.
This article was written in satisfaction of the thesis requirement of the
Master of Laws in the Judicial Process degree, University of Virginia.
The views expressed herein (and errors) are individual to me as a student
of supervisory power. They do not represent the views of the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware, or of myself in any official capacity.
Special thanks is extended to Peter W. Low, Hardy C. Dillard Professor of
Law, University of Virginia School of Law, whose insight and comments made
a significant contribution to sharpening the focus of this article.
Sincere appreciation is expressed to Catherine J. Lanctot, J.D. 1981, Georgetown University Law Center, and Jeffrey B. Messing, J.D. 1981, Yale Law
School, who, as unwilling students of supervisory power, nonetheless succeeded
in forcing the author to grudgingly modify his views. Also, thanks is given to
Joan M. Griffith for the typing of innumerable drafts and the final manuscript.
1. In the United States Supreme Court the current expansion of supervisory power began in 1943 with McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
However, prior to 1970, the Third Circuit's supervisory power was expressly
implicated in only three cases-twice in criminal matters arising in the Virgin
Islands in the late 1960's: Government of Virgin Islands v. Bell, 392 F.2d 207
(3d Cir. 1968), and Government of Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1967); and in one civil case: Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224
F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956).
2. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (banning use in
federal trials of evidence illegally seized by state officers); Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (reversing conviction tainted by possible perjury of
principal government witness); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (reversing administrative order where evidence that
three government witnesses had committed perjury); Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214 (1956) (barring federal agent from testifying in state prosecution
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and overseeing activity of the executive branch. 4 In the Third
Circuit, supervisory power has been asserted, if not always exercised,
in a wide variety of contexts in both the civil and criminal areas.
The nature of supervisory power is amorphous and its doctrinal
limitations are ill-defined. In an effort to analyze its explosive
growth in recent years, this article will probe the origins and
sources of intermediate appellate court supervisory power, survey
the extent of the exercise of that power by the Third Circuit, and
draw conclusions as to the legitimacy of its exercise.
Defining supervisory power presents an initial problem. The
Supreme Court generally refers to its "power of supervision over the
administration of justice in the federal courts." 5 This power has
included such elements as "the formulation and application of
proper standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law,"
including the "duty of establishing and maintaining standards of
procedure and evidence;" 6 the power to police and make certain
that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are honored by
federal law enforcement agencies; 7 the power under which evidentiary rules may be devised "governed by 'principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted . . .in the light of reason

and experience;' "8 the power to ensure that "the waters of justice
are not polluted;" 9 and, finally, the power to further the " 'twofold'
purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity." 10
These phrases indicate the broad nature of the doctrine at the
Supreme Court level.
regarding illegal federal search); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)
(confession obtained in violation of federal law requiring prompt arraignment

before magistrate inadmissible in federal court).

But see United States v.

Payner, 447 U.S.'727 (1980) (evidence obtained in violation of third party's

constitutional rights may not be excluded under supervisory power).
3. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (barring exclusion of

women from federal juries when state law permitted them to serve); Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (barring exclusion of daily wage earners
from federal juries).

4. See note 2 supra.
5. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946).
6. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
7. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
8. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960), quoting FED. R. CRIM.

P. 26.

9. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).

The Court articulated

this same rationale in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
351 U.S. 115 (1956), noting that "fastidious regard for the honor of the admin.
istration of justice requires the Court to make certain that the doing of justice

be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can
be asserted." Id. at 124.
10. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980).
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This breadth is equally apparent at the intermediate appellate
level. Occasionally, members of the Third Circuit have articulated
their understanding of supervisory power. One member of the
court has simply stated:
Deciding a case in the exercise of a court's supervisory
power means little more than ruling on a basis not
specifically set forth in the Constitution, or by statute,
procedural rule, or precedent. Although generally associated with the imposition of procedural safeguards for
proper judicial administration, exercise of the supervisory
power of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is
but a legitimate function of a court's law-making role."
Another judge has described his perception of supervisory power
as enabling appellate courts to impose policy judgments on the
lower federal courts, stating that "[a]ppellate courts, it appears,
exercise their supervisory power over lower courts to impose procedural requirements that seem wise, but that are not compelled by
the Constitution or statute." 12 In fact, the court itself has cited
with approval a statement by the Supreme Court asserting that
"[o]ver federal proceedings we may exert a supervisory power with
greater freedom to reflect our notions of good policy than we may
constitutionally exert over proceedings in state courts."

13

These

statements indicate an expansive reading of supervisory power by
members of the Third Circuit. It appears that supervisory power
embraces any decision not based on the Constitution, statutes,
procedural rules, or precedent, including decisions based on policy
grounds. The lack of clear perimeters often makes it difficult to
determine whether the Third Circuit has actually exercised its
11. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 970 (3d Cir.)
(Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).

12. United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 12 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Adams, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (footnote omitted).

13. United States ex rel. Sturdivant v. New Jersey, 289 F.2d 846, 848
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961), quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261, 287 (1947). The Third Circuit reaffirmed its acceptance of the language
employed in Fay in United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 558 n.44 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980). See also Evans v. Buchanan, 582
F.2d 750, 776 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 923 (1980), quoting In re

Grand Jury Subpoenas, 573 F.2d 936, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Courts of Appeals, pursuant to their supervisory powers, may review in a mandamus proceeding questions of unusual importance necessary to the economical and effective administration of justice."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II),
507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir. 1975) ("But under our supervisory power over the

grand jury and over the district court's enforcement of subpoenas ....
we feel
empowered to specify the particular way in which relevancy and proper purpose
of a grand jury investigation shall be shown in this Circuit.").
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supervisory power, or instead has based its decision on an alterna4
tive ground.'

A brief examination of the Third Circuit cases involving
supervisory power reveals the virtually unlimited scope of the
doctrine. In the criminal area, the Third Circuit has rarely purported to exercise supervisory power over the executive branch. 15
14. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1462 (3d Cir.), vacated and set for rehearing en banc. No. 80-2571 (3d
Cir. Nov. 6, 1981); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1981) (imposition of deadline for formulation of desegregation decree by district court);
United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring strict compliance
with terms of expanded Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure);
United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978) (approval of expanded use
of conditional guilty pleas); Hargenrader v. Califano, 575 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.
1978) (imposition of requirement of subordinate findings of fact in social security eligibility hearings); United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) (prospective banning of standard jury instruction);
Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976) (requiring factual
pleading in civil rights cases); Conley v. Dauer, 463 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972) (requiring district court to ensure state court system
adhered to federal precedent on appointment of counsel); United States v.
D'Amato, 436 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1970) (first approving use of conditional pleas in
Third Circuit); Government of Virgin Islands v. Bell, 392 F.2d 207 (3d Cir.
1968) (supervisory power mentioned as possible alternative ground for decision).
At other times, the court asserts for the first time in a later case that an
earlier case was predicated on supervisory power. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Redman,
616 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980) (advising that United
States v. Poole, 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971), was decided under its supervisory
power); United States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 972 (1977) (advising that holding of United States v.
LcFevre, 483 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1973), had supervisory power underpinnings).
The court on at least one occasion has also asserted that it was relying on
supervisory power when it clearly was not. As noted, in Jacobs v. Redman,
supra, the court characterized an earlier voir dire case, United States v. Poole,
supra, as having been a supervisory power case. This presumably would mean
that other reversals in voir dire cases were also exercises of supervisory power.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965);
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965). Nevertheless, these cases are
not exercises of supervisory power, but rather represent substantive case law development by reversing district courts for abuses of discretion in failing to ask
certain questions of veniremen upon request.
The Third Circuit has also denied using supervisory power on one occasion
when it clearly had done so. See United States v. Mitchell, 540 F.2d 1163
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (suggesting the desirability of
government notification of the existence of pretrial identification procedures
prior to trial while disclaiming reliance on its supervisory power to adopt a
requirement).
These problems, coupled with the fact that it is not always clear where
the line is drawn between reversal for abuse of discretion and exercise of supervisory power, mean that this article may not include a discussion of every
exercise of supervisory power by the Third Circuit.
15. Although the court has yet to reverse a conviction through the exercise
of its supervisory power over the executive branch, it has twice remanded cases
to the district court on that basis. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807
(3d Cir. 1979) (misuse of IRS subpoenas); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Schofield I), 486 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1973) (governmental misconduct before grand
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In contrast, in cases involving the judicial branch, the Third Circuit has actively used its supervisory power, either to engage in
judicial procedural rulemaking, or to formulate or approve procedural innovations. 16 Among the procedural matters affected by
its exercise of supervisory power are the litany required under
Rule 11,17 conditional plea agreements,' 8 enforcement of grand jury

subpoenas, 19 and other grand jury procedures, 20 and enforcement
of Internal Revenue Service summonses. 21 Other directives have
addressed the procedure to be employed in asking voir dire ques22
tions when there is a possibility of prejudicial pretrial publicity,

the requirement of notice by the government of prior identification
procedures, 23 and the procedure to be followed in issuing gag
orders. 24 Third Circuit supervision of criminal justice has not
jury). However, the court has addressed the issue of supervisory power in a
number of cases involving the executive branch. See United States v. Birdman,
602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980) (governmental
misconduct before grand jury); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d
Cir. 1978) (federal immunity statute); United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194
(3d Cir. 1978) (governmental misconduct before grand jury); United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976) (misuse of grand jury subpoenas); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1015 (1975) (governmental misconduct before grand jury); United
States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974) (failure of prosecutor to warn
witness before grand jury of recantation provision of perjury statute); United
States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1974) (government's obligation to
record all grand jury testimony, if any such testimony is to be recorded); United
States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973) (district court's obligation to
correct prosecutorial misconduct at trial).
16. Judicial procedural rulemaking is distinguishable from procedural innovation in that in the former supervisory power is used to alter existing federal
court rules whereas in the latter the power is used to create a rule to govern
an area not covered by existing rules. As formal federal court rules are
amended over time, it is possible for what was once procedural innovation to
become judicial procedural rulemaking.
17. See United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981); United States
v. Dixon, 504 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1974).
18. See United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. D'Amato, 436
F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1970).
19. See In re Grand jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I),
486 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1973).
20. See United States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1974).
21. See United States v. Waltman, 525 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1975).
22. See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1972).
23. See United States v. Mitchell, 540 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied,
429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
24. See United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974).
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been confined to matters of procedure. The court has used supervisory power to require certain jury instructions with prospective
application only, 25 as well as other substantive matters.2 6

The Third Circuit has employed supervisory power in civil
cases as well. 27 Unlike criminal cases, where supervisory power is
most frequently used to develop prospective rules, supervisory
power holdings in the civil context are generally case-specific.
There is a further difference between civil and criminal cases. In
civil cases, with few exceptions, 2s the court either openly acknowledges that it relies on supervisory power, 29 or a dissenting opinion
25. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) (prohibition of Mann charge); United
States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978)
(prohibition of Mann charge); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 958 (1971) (eyewitness identification jury instruction
required prospectively). But see United States v. Wilford, 493 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974) (failure to give Barber instruction not
plain error under circumstances). A Mann charge is a jury instruction which
states that "unless the evidence points otherwise, a jury may infer that 'one
intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act.'" United States
v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d at 1273, quoting United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d at
780.
26. Government of Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970)
(ordering new trial to negate possible prejudice of juror); Government of
Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 964
(1969) (making Jencks Act applicable to Virgin Islands).
27. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1462, vacated and set for rehearing en banc, No. 80-2571 (3d Cir. Nov.
6, 1981); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969 (3d
Cir. 1981); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980); Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633
(3d Cir. 1978); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 923 (1980); Hargenrader v. Califano, 575 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1978);
American Iron k: Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 914 (1978); Gould v. Members of N.J. Div. of Water Policy & Supply,
555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1977); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920
(3d Cir. 1976); Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973);
Conley v. Dauer, 463 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972);
Domeracki v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 883 (1971); Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956).
28. The court has consistently failed to acknowledge its reliance on supervisory power in those cases in which it has created a requirement that civil
rights complaints, especially those drafted by experienced counsel, must set
forth with specificity the acts of each defendant that are alleged to have violated the plaintiff's civil rights. See Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d
86 (3d Cir. 1978); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976);
Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d IlI (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040
(1972); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846
(1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
The court has failed on occasion to articulate its reliance on supervisory
power in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d
972 (3d Cir. 1981); Hargenrader v. Califano, 575 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1978).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, Nos. 80-2309 & 80-2482 (3d Cir., Mar.
26, 1982); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969
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is quick to point out that fact. 30 As a consequence, in civil cases
there is far less uncertainty as to whether a particular case has
been decided under the Third Circuit's supervisory power.
Nonetheless, the rationale for these exercises of supervisory
power has not always been articulated. The Third Circuit has
explained its use of supervisory power to "regulate certain procedural matters of significance," 31 or to "promote the administration of justice." 82 It has cited such varying concerns as "fairness
and rationality," -3 protection of citizens against an arbitrary
prosecutor,3 4 "congested criminal trial calendars," 35 and reduction
of the volume of appeals over the same issue." These concerns
may explain, but cannot justify, the Third Circuit's willingness to
employ what seems to be a nearly limitless power.
This article examines the nature of supervisory power as exercised by one intermediate appellate court-the Third Circuit. The
purpose of this study is to determine the source of this power and
whether it truly is nothing more than "standardless discretion." 3i
The fact that no panel of the Third Circuit has articulated a
persuasive theoretical framework to determine where the power
comes from and when it should be exercised raises grave questions
about the legitimacy of any exercise of supervisory power.8 With(3d Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980); Evans v.

Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 923 (1980);

Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1978); American Iron & Steel Inst.
v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); Gould
v. Members of N.J. Div. of Water Policy & Supply, 555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.
1977); Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973) (Rosenn, J.,
concurring); Domeracki v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414
(3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956).
30. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA)1462, vacated and set for rehearing en banc, No. 80-2571 (3d Cir. Nov. 6,
1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Conley v. Dauer, 463 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
31. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1980).
32. United States v. Waltman, 525 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1975).
33. United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1138 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978) (Adams, J., concurring); United States v. Mitchell,
540 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
34. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir.
1973) (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
35. United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1978).
36. United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293, 299 & n.18 (3d Cir. 1980).
37. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733 (1980).
38. In at least three cases, vigorous unanswered dissents questioned the
existence of the supervisory power upon which the majority relied and acted.
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 989 (3d Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., dissenting);
Hargenrader v. Califano, 575 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir. 1978) (Aldisert, J., dissent-
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out a sound doctrinal basis, exercise of supervisory power can
become little more than a device to enable a court of appeals to
impose its policy judgments upon the district courts.
The first area of inquiry is the source of intermediate appellate
court supervisory power within the federal system. Various sources,
-the Constitution, congressional enactment, and Supreme Court
precedent-will be examined in order to determine whether
they provide a basis for intermediate appellate exercise of supervisory power. That examination will show that although the Constitution provides no basis for supervisory power, both the statute
creating the courts of appeals and certain statements by the
Supreme Court may support its existence. However, a careful
reading of these sources reveals that they are not broad enough to
support all of the exercises of supervisory power by the Third
Circuit. These sources limit the exercise of supervisory power to
those situations which involve matters within the traditional competence of the courts or which aid the appellate court in carrying
out its traditional functions.
The article then examines various other limitations which the
Third Circuit has recognized as restraining its use of supervisory
power. The doctrine of separation of powers precludes the exercise of supervisory power when it would interfere with activities of
the legislative or executive branches. Concepts of federalism have
been acknowledged to limit the applicability of supervisory power
to state proceedings. Finally, both congressional enactment and
Supreme Court precedent can prevent a court of appeals from exercising supervisory power. Thus, the "standardless discretion" of
supervisory power is limited by a number of forces.
An examination of the cases in light of this analysis will
demonstrate that the exercise of supervisory power by the Third
Circuit often lacks a principled basis. As to one area of frequent
exercise, the establishment of procedural rules, the article concludes
that it is possible to classify such exercise into three categories and
proposes an analytic framework for determining the validity of
exercise within each category. The first category encompasses
situations in which Congress has developed a specific process for
rulemaking, and that process has resulted in a formal rule. In these
situations, any exercise of supervisory power by a court of appeals
to establish contrary procedural rules is illegitimate. The second
category contains instances in which a rulemaking mechanism has
ing); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974) (Aldisert & Weis, JJ., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/3

8

Schwartz: The Exercise of Supervisory Power by the Third Circuit Court of A

[VOL. 27: p. 506

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

been created and a rule promulgated, but there is a perceived need
to supplement the rule. Such supplementation, which goes beyond
filling interstitial gaps through judicial construction, even if desirable, is illegitimate. The third category is comprised of situations in which there is a rulemaking mechanism in place, but no
rule has been promulgated. In such cases, the courts of appeals
must exercise supervisory power to fill the void created by the
default. If such exercises are within the traditional competence
of the courts or essential to. the discharge of the appellate function,
then the courts may exercise supervisory power. Third Circuit
cases in which supervisory power was exercised to establish procedural rules are then analyzed within this framework to determine
whether, on balance, the court has properly restrained itself in its
use of supervisory power. For those cases in which the court's
action is invalid, a mechanism will be proposed to legitimize the
exercise of supervisory power.
II.

SOURCES OF SUPERVISORY

POWER

The Third Circuit rarely sets forth the source of its authority
to exercise supervisory power. An independent examination must
therefore be undertaken in order to discover a principled basis for
its exercise. Three sources suggest themselves-the Constitution,
congressional statute, and Supreme Court pronouncement. 39
A. The Constitution as a Source of Supervisory Power
The Constitution provides little support for the exercise of
supervisory power by the courts of appeals. Article III does not
itself create lower federal courts; it merely vests federal judicial
power "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." 40 Nothing in article III empowers
any federal court to exercise power which is not grounded in the
Constitution, statute, rule, or precedent. It might be argued that
although Congress need not establish lower federal courts, once
39. The published literature has universally commented on the lack of

legitimization of supervisory power at the Supreme Court and intermediate
court level. See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 181 (1969); Comment, Judicially Required Rulemaking as Fourth
Amendment Policy: An Applied Analysis of the Supervisory Power of the
Federal Courts, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 595 (1977); Note, Supervisory Power in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 642 (1978); Note, The

Judge Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEo. L.J. 1050 (1965);
Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656
(1963).

40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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they are created under article III those courts have all the inherent
powers that courts have historically possessed in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. However, this argument does not advance the
inquiry, for nowhere in the Constitution are these inherent powers
defined. 4 1 Moreover, beginning with the Process Act in 1789,42
Congress has explicitly governed matters traditionally regarded as
being within the competence of the courts, in particular the procedures by which cases in law and equity should be tried.43 Thus,
the mere assertion that a court created under article III has certain
inherent powers cannot rise to the level of a constitutional justification for an exercise of supervisory power by a court of appeals.
B. Statutory Enactments as a Source of Supervisory Power
Statutes as a source of supervisory power must be approached
more cautiously. Certain statutes, by definition, do not confer the
type of supervisory power under discussion. A substantive statute
placing some element of supervision in a federal court cannot be
the source of supervisory power, because by definition the exercise
of power under a statute is not a use of supervisory power. Similarly, the All Writs Act, 44 the successor to statutory authorization
41. One can persuasively argue that history, not the Constitution, defines
the powers. Unhappily, history provides no answers. As one commentator
has noted:
[W]hat has been referred to in the modern case law as the supervisory
power has indefinite constitutional moorings. Commentators have
recognized its similarity to the exercise of prerogative writs by the
Court of the King's Bench. Lord Coke described the scope of this
common law judicial power:
[T]his court hath not onely jurisdiction to correct errors in judiciall
proceeding, but other errors and misdemeanors extrajudiciall tending to the breach of the peace, or oppression of the subjects, or
raising of faction, controversy, debate, or any other manner of
misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either publick or
private, can be done, but that this shall be reformed or punished
in one court or other by due process of law.
The extent to which this history is relevant to the American constitutional system, with its distinctive view of the separation of powers,
is not clear.
Comment, supra note 39, at 615 (footnotes omitted).
42. Process Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 93, 94 (1789).
43. For a brief criticism of such congressional action as unconstitutional,
see Note, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928), where Professor Wigmore asserts that the
judicial power as defined in article III encompasses the power of courts to
regulate their own procedure.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). This statute authorizes "[t]he Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress (to] issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." Id.
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for writs of mandamus and prohibition,45 simply provides a means
of supervising lower courts under certain circumstances, but cannot
46
be the source of the broad supervisory power under consideration.
Likewise, legislation empowering judicial councils to supervise a
specific aspect of judicial administration, such as the Judicial
47
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
cannot be the source of unlimited supervisory power.
45. The writs of mandamus and prohibition originated in England as
prerogative writs. They could be issued only by the Court of King's Bench
which had general supervisory power over all inferior officers and jurisdictions
by virtue of the fact that the King had originally sat there in person and aided
in the administration of justice. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 364, 433 (1838); King v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1265, 97 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B.
1762). Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the Supreme
Court to issue "writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and
usages of laws to any courts appointed, or persons holding office under the
authority of the United States." judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 81 (1789).
The authority of the circuit courts (precursors to the courts of appeals) to issue
the writs was included in § 14's general authorization "to issue all other writs
not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise
of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of
law." Id. § 14. The courts soon recognized that the writs authorized by these
statutes were not the prerogative writs of the King's Bench. See Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 434; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
87, 106-07 (1803); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 177-79 (1st Cir. 1954). Rather
than telling the inferior courts how to rule, the American writs simply directed
them to proceed, according to their own judgment, to a final determination so
that the case could be reviewed by the appellate court. Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 434.
The Supreme Court's authority under § 13 was broader than that of the
circuit and district courts under § 14. The former section authorized the Court
to exercise a general "supervisory power" over the lower courts whether or not
it had been given statutory appellate jurisdiction or potential appellate jurisdiction. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 117 n.15 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d at 177-79. In contrast, the latter
section granted only an auxiliary power, which could be used only if another
statute conferred appellate jurisdiction. Id.; see McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 503 (1813); United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir.
1981). The courts' current authority to issue the writs is contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1976). For the relevant text of § 1651(a) see note 44 supra.
46. There may be some doubt as to the effect of the All Writs Act on the
broader powers of the Supreme Court. See generally Chandler v. Judicial
Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970). Nevertheless, courts of appeals are unquestionably
limited in their use of the writs to confining the district courts to the lawful
exercise of their prescribed jurisdiction. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976). The writs' function is to prevent a
district court from rendering an appeal impossible or otherwise frustrating or
impeding the ultimate exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255, 259-60 (1957). Thus, a writ may issue to compel
a district court to entertain diversity actions improperly remanded to state
court, Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. at 352; to empanel
an investigatory grand jury, United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 896 (3d
Cir. 1981) (denying writ on substantive grounds), or to prevent the improper
transfer of a suit to another district, In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (Ist Cir.
1954) (denying writ on substantive grounds).
47. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
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1. The Court of Appeals Act
The Third Circuit has never attempted to justify its exercises
of supervisory power on statutory grounds. Nevertheless, if supervisory power can be attributable to statute at all, it must stem from
legislation establishing the intermediate appellate court system, and
the function assigned to that system by Congress. Congress established the courts of appeals in 1891, providing that the courts were
to be "of record with appellate jurisdiction as hereinafter limited
and established." 48 The rather unstartling conclusion to be drawn
from the legislative history of the Court of Appeals Act is that the
intended function of the courts of appeals was twofold: to lessen
the burden on the Supreme Court, and to provide a forum to
review the bulk of previously unreviewable trial court judgments. 4
48. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Although
the current version of the statute omits the reference to appellate jurisdiction,
the reviser's note explains that similar provisions are currently found in the
separate jurisdictional sections. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 43(a), 1291 (1976).
49. Prior to the creation of the courts of appeals, the federal court system
consisted of the district courts, the circuit courts, and the Supreme Court. The
circuit courts had significant original jurisdiction as well as the authority to
review on writ of error the final decisions of district courts in most civil cases.
Review by writ of error could be sought in the Supreme Court in any civil
case in which the matter in dispute exceeded two thousand dollars exclusive
of costs. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, I Stat.
73 (1789). That amount was raised to five thousand dollars in 1875. Act of
Feb. 16, 1875, § 3, 18 Stat. 315 (1875). Although several attempts were made
to alleviate the strain during the next hundred years, by 1891 the burden this
system placed on the Supreme Court was thought to be intolerable. See generally 22 CONG. REc. 3584 (1891) (remarks of Rep. Rogers); P. BATOR, P. MISlKIN, P.

SHAPIRO,

H.

WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

32-41 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
J.

LANDIS,

HART & WECHSLER]; F. FRANKFURTER &:
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL

JUDICIAL SYSTEM 86-88 (1928) [hereinafter cited as F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS].
The establishment of intermcdiate appellate courts was part of a larger

scheme designed to relieve that burden. For purposes of the present discussion
only a few elements of that scheme need be examined. The Circuit Court of

Appeals Act established three-judge courts of appeals in each of the nine existing circuits. The circuit courts' appellate jurisdiction over the district courts

was abolished, although the circuit courts themselves were not abolished until
1911.

Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911).

Certain decisions of the trial

courts remained subject to direct review by the Supreme Court. The decisions
of the courts of appeals were declared to be "final" in diversity cases, suits
brought under the revenue and patent laws, criminal prosecutions, and admiralty suits, but Supreme Court review in those cases was available through
issuance of the newly authorized writ of certiorari. Circuit Court of Appeals
Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). See HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 41.
Although Congress' primary concern was with the state of the Supreme
Court's docket, the courts of appeals were also intended to destroy "the opportunity for circuit and district judges to play the role of the despot or tyrant in
nonappealable cases .... ." 22 CONG. REc. 3885 (1891) (remarks of Rep. Culberson); 21 CONG. REc. 3403 (1891) (remarks of Rep. Culberson). This is in
reference to the fact that a decision by a one-judge circuit court had been final
in all cases involving less than the jurisdictional amount. In addition, since
the circuit courts exercised some appellate jurisdiction, it frequently happened
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Traditionally, the primary function of an intermediate appellate
court is to correct trial court errors of law and set aside the court's
findings of fact if clearly erroneous.5 0 The Supreme Court has
also delineated the function of a court of appeals in similar terms:
On appeal, the task of a court of appeals is defined
with relative clarity; it is confined by law and precedent,
just as are those of the district courts and of this Court.
If it concludes that the findings of the district court are
clearly erroneous, it may set them aside under Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 52(a). If it decides that the district court has
misapprehended the law, it may accept that court's findings of fact but reverse its judgment because of legal
errors.

51

Those exercises of supervisory power which aid a court of
appeals in carrying out its traditional functions can be legitimized by reference to the Court of Appeals Act. In addition,
exercises of supervisory power which further such traditional
judicial functions as the regulation and improvement of the
quality of the judicial process are within the courts' traditional
sphere of competence, 52 and can therefore be legitimized by reference to the congressional intent underlying the creation of the
intermediate appellate courts. 53 In exercising its constitutional
that a district judge sitting in the circuit court sat in sole judgment upon
himself as judge of the district court. 21 CONG. REc. 3404 (1891) (remarks of
Rep. Culberson); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra, at 87-88; HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 36. It was thought to be impossible for a trial judge to escape
the influence surrounding an important trial and that the right to a review of
a trial court's judgments "upon the record before another tribunal was therefore
required." 21 CONG. REc. 3404 (1891) (remarks by Rep. Culberson).
50. The Third Circuit has concurred in this formulation of its function,
albeit in a different context: "An appellate court's role in reviewing jury instructions is to examine the entire charge in order to determine whether the district
judge properly performed his function. The district judge is responsible for
giving the jury the guidance by which it can make appropriate conclusions
from the testimony." United States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778, 781-82 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) (citation omitted).
51. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417-18 (1977).
52. See generally Hill, supra note 39, at 194. Professor Hill intimates that
there could well be a theoretical difference between supervisory power emanating from legislative enactment-inherent power-and "the necessary implication
of [legislation which by its silence constitutes] general grants of jurisdiction and
remedial authority .... ." Id. It is not necessary to determine whether the
concept of inherent power is severable from implied power because for purposes
of legitimizing an exercise of supervisory power it makes no difference.
53. It should be emphasized that in acknowledging the legitimacy of exercises of supervisory power in aid of "traditional judicial functions," this article
does not intend to argue for the acceptance of all exercises which plausibly
could be considered to advance such concepts as equity or justice. Rather, the
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authority to create inferior federal courts, Congress did not act in a
vacuum. By providing that the courts of appeals should be "courts
of record," Congress bestowed a certain amount of that amorphous
baggage known as the inherent power of the courts upon the new
appellate courts. Supervisory power grounded in such an elusive,
ill-defined concept is a fragile creature at best. It must give way
to congressional act, court rule, and all other doctrinal limitations
and principles which, in the ordinary course of events, would
obviate the power. However, given the narrowness of its statutory
justifications, the inherent power of an appellate court cannot be
employed to regulate the conduct of another branch of government,
or, for that matter, since United States v. Payner,54 solely to protect
the integrity of the court. Neither action is part of the traditional
function of an appellate court.
Without expressly relying on the Court of Appeals Act, the
Third Circuit has on several occasions employed supervisory power
to further its appellate function. Thus, for example, the Third
Circuit has relied on its supervisory power to prospectively require 51 or approve 56 jury charges. It has also ordered a new trial
when a criminal defendant was convicted by a jury which included
a juror who would have been excused for cause but for his failure
to respond to questioning during voir dire.5 7 In each of these instances, the Third Circuit performed its proper function of correcting and preventing lower court error.
At times, however, the Third Circuit has strayed from its
designated role and exercised its supervisory power in such a
manner as to usurp functions of the district courts. Perhaps the
most striking example of such an improper exercise is Hoots v.
5 8 In Hoots, the Third Circuit, impatient with the
Pennsylvania.
vagaries of litigation which had held up resolution of the remedial
class of traditional judicial functions should be understood to include items
such as the creation of the pre-code federal rules of evidence, which, although
not based on constitution, rule, or statute, was conceded to be within the traditional competence of the courts. In the example given, the development of
common law rules of evidence also illustrates the limitations of such exercises
because congressional action ultimately displaced the rules.
54. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
55. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); Domeracki v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 443
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1971).
56. See United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 846, 958 (1971). But cf. United States v. Wilford, 493 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974).
57. Government of Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970).
58. 639 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1981).
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phase of a complex school desegregation case, ordered the district
judge to complete all hearings and proceedings on the merits and
issue a desegregation decree within ninety days.5 9 The decision is
especially noteworthy because formulation of a desegregation decree
is a discretionary function placed in the first instance in the district
court. 60 The dissent sharply questioned whether an appellate
court had the power to enter such an order and noted the enormous
difficulties created by the Third Circuit's action:
[W]e have neither the right nor any power to order [a
district judge] to complete his processing of this case
within a time limit of 90 days. If there is such a right or
power, I do not know from whence it stems, and absent
such a power, there is no reason for a federal judge to give
heed to our mandate.
[If] he cannot, or does not, do we hold him in contempt?
Do we subject him to some form of disciplinary proceeding? Do we remove his caseload? Do we hold a hearing
and ask him to show cause why he has violated the 90 day
mandate? What action can we take? 61
Although Hoots is by far the most dramatic example of a
Third Circuit exercise of supervisory power in excess of its function, it is not a lone aberration. On three other occasions the
court asserted its authority to remove district judges from further
participation in particular cases. In Johnson v. Trueblood,62 the
59. Id. at 980-81.
60. The timing of the performance of a discretionary function at the district court level can, in rare instances, be subject to intermediate appellate
court control, but not as an exercise of its supervisory power. If, for example,
a district court rules in a manner to avoid adjudication and thus frustrate an
appeal, mandamus is an appropriate remedy. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976). Presumably, mandamus would also be
available where the district judge persists over time in refusing to rule or issue
an appealable order. The mandamus writ is invariably obeyed out of recognition that if it were not, "anarchy . . . [would] prevail in the federal judicial
system." See Hutto v. Davis, 50 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982). An intermediate appellate court can also control the timing of a discretionary order at
the district court level if that power is specifically vested in the appellate court
by the Supreme Court. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396
U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam) (power placed in United States Court of Appeals
for Fifth Circuit to expedite school desegregation); United States v. Hinds
County School Bd., 423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1032 (1970) (power exercised by appellate court as set forth in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)). See also Singleton v.
Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 426 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 944 (1971).
61. 639 F.2d at 996 (Garth, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
62. 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980).
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court vacated the district court's retroactive revocation of an attorney's pro hac vice status and exercised its supervisory power to
impose a pre-revocation notice and comment requirement in such
cases. 63 The court concluded on the facts presented that if the
revocation were pursued further, the case should be assigned to a
different judge.6 4 Although on the facts such reassignment may
well have been warranted, the court did not hold that the judge's
refusal to recuse himself would have been an abuse of discretion.
From the opinion it appears the court simply decided that it would
rather not have him hear the case. Indeed, the earlier case of
Poteet v. Fauver 6 makes it clear that Trueblood was an exercise of
supervisory power, rather than a holding based upon an abuse of
discretion by the district court. In Poteet, a state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the state trial
judge's action in increasing his sentence because he persisted in
asserting his innocence after a guilty verdict was entered.6 6 In the
course of ordering that the writ issue unless state authorities resentenced the petitioner, the court stated:
We will reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand these proceedings with a specific direction. The
district court will issue a writ of habeas corpus unless
[state] authorities agree to vacate the sentence heretofore
imposed and accord appellant a new opportunity for
sentencing. Were the trial court in the federal system we
would exercise our supervisory power and direct that
7
another judge be assigned for resentencing.
Finally, in Lewis v. Curtis,68 the court reversed the district court's
final order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and denying his
motion for leave to amend, and ordered that the case be assigned
to a different judge on remand. 69 The Third Circuit justified its
action by stating:
Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in a
judicial officer are the sine qua non of the American
legal system. . . . Without pausing to consider whether
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id.
65. 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 394.

67. Id. at 398.
68. No. 81-2055 (3d Cir. Mar. 3, 1982).
69. Id., slip op. at 19-20.
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there is a basis for legal disqualification, we conclude that
the undisputed facts dictate that the appearance of justice
will be served only if the assignment to another judge is
made, and we will, pursuant to our supervisory power, so
70
direct.
Another example is DeMasi v. Weiss, 71 where the Third Circuit
ordered a district court to stay a discovery order until the liability
phase of the trial had concluded in order to avoid deciding a difficult discovery issue. A consideration of the above cases leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the Third Circuit is asserting a
broad power over the day-to-day management of the district court
workload. The source for this power cannot be found in the
statutory framework which established the courts of appeals.
In contrast, the court has, on at least one occasion, declined to
exercise supervisory power, and in so doing effectively disabled
7itself from performing its functions. In Wood v. Zapata Corp.,
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition directed
to a district court which had ordered an action transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 78 Petitioner alleged that the order
should have been vacated because the district court had relied on
an untranscribed conference. 74 Noting that there was no requirement that conferences in chambers be transcribed, the court denied
the petition. 75 The problem with this holding was noted by both
the concurring and dissenting judges: without a record it is impossible for an appellate court to review the district court's decisions for errors of law or fact."
2. The "Trickle-Up" Theory
Although the Third Circuit has not attempted to justify its
exercise of supervisory power by relying upon the statutory enactment which created the courts of appeals, it has occasionally pointed
to a different statutory basis to support certain exercises of supervisory power. At times, the Third Circuit has asserted that stat70. Id. (emphasis added).

71. Nos. 81-271 & 81-2192 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 1982).
72. 482 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1973).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 351.

75. Id. at 356.
76. Id. at 357 (Adams, J., concurring); id. at 358 (Biggs, J., dissenting).
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utory grants of power to district courts carry with them a related
supervisory power vested in the courts of appeals. This "trickle-up"
theory for the exercise of supervisory power was relied on in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I) 7 7 where, in establishing
flexible procedural requirements for contesting enforcement of a
grand jury subpoena, the court stated that "[W]e impose this requirement both pursuant to the federal courts' supervisory power
over grand juries and pursuant to our supervisory power over
civil proceedings brought in the district court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a)." 78 The court dispelled any latent ambiguity as
to the source of the power relied upon when it later repeated and
amplified its prior position in affirming a finding of contempt:
Our supervisory power over grand juries is derived from
several sources. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3331 and Fed. R. Crim.
P. 6(a) a district court is given power to call a grand jury
into existence; under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(a), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1826(a) respectively, the district court is given the power
to issue and the duty to enforce grand jury subpoenas.
But under our supervisory power over the grand jury and
over the district court's enforcement of subpoenas ...
we feel empowered to specify the particular way in which
relevancy and proper purpose of a grand jury investigation
shall be shown in this Circuit.79
The Third Circuit thus transformed statutory and rule power
vested in the district court into supervisory power at the appellate
level. Inasmuch as these cases involve powers specifically allocated
by Congress to the district courts, not the courts of appeals, the
function of the appellate courts should be limited to a determination of whether the district court committed error. Although
every grant of power to a district court carries with it a concomitant
appellate court power to define its limit, the statutory power remains in the district court. In short, the court of appeals has no
"supervisory power over the grand jury." The Third Circuit's
reliance on the "trickle-up" theory to legitimize exercises of supervisory power is misplaced.
77. 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1977).

78. Id. at 93.
79. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 964 n.2, 966

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975) (emphasis added).
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C. Supreme Court Pronouncements as a Source of
Supervisory Power
The Supreme Court provides an additional potential source of
intermediate appellate court supervisory power. The Supreme
Court may be a source for this power either through a "trickledown" theory, or by express statement. The "trickle-down" theory
provides that if the Supreme Court has supervisory power over all
lower federal courts, then the courts of appeals have supervisory
power over the district courts. Although the Third Circuit has
never expressly articulated this theory, on occasion it has cited
cases in which the Supreme Court relied on its supervisory power
to support its own assertions of supervisory power.8 0 However, the
mere fact that the Supreme Court exercises supervisory power, of
whatever legitimacy, 8' over the federal court system as a whole
cannot in and of itself justify even the more limited exercises by an
intermediate appellate court. Moreover, given the structure of the
federal court system, it is by no means self-evident that the existence of such a power in the Supreme Court, which is capable of
imposing uniform, systemwide standards, implies the existence of
analogous powers in regional intermediate appellate courts. Thus,
the citation of cases involving Supreme Court exercises of supervisory power cannot, without more, legitimize the Third Circuit's
exercise of similar powers.
Supreme Court statements provide a stronger basis for asserting the existence of supervisory power in the courts of appeals.
Although some have questioned the very existence of such power,8 2
Supreme Court pronouncement leaves no doubt that the power
does exist.8 Unfortunately, although Supreme Court statements
80. See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 558 n.44 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980) (citing McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943)); United States ex rel. Sturdivant v. New Jersey, 289 F.2d 846,

848 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 864 (1961) (quoting Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261, 287 (1947)).
81. See note 39 supra.
82. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (9th Cir.), rev'd
on rehearing, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (Byrne, J., dissenting); Note,
Supervisory Power in the United States Courts of Appeals, supra note 39, at

661-62.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Ehrlichman v.
Sirica, 419 U.S. 1310 (Burger, Circuit Judge 1974); Cupp v. Naughten, 414
U.S. 141 (1973); Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52 (1963); Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). The intriguing question of whether the Supreme
Court can in fact legitimize the exercise of such power by the courts of appeals
is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses merely on the legitimacy of
those exercises within the judicial framework.
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may establish the existence of intermediate appellate court supervisory power, they do not advance the inquiry as to whether any
particular exercise of supervisory power is legitimate. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Supreme Court has never
explained the basis for its assertion that the courts of appeals have
supervisory power. The most recent Supreme Court case simply
assumes the existence of supervisory power in the intermediate
courts of appeal, and addresses instead the issue of whether the
84
power was properly exercised.
III.

LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER

The exercise of supervisory power is constrained not only by
the requirement that it be limited to the furtherance of the appellate function and matters traditionally within the special competence of appellate courts to improve the judicial process, but by
other doctrines as well. The definition of supervisory power is
itself a limitation on its exercise. In addition, the doctrines of
separation of powers and federalism both preclude certain exercises of supervisory power. Finally, both congressional action and
Supreme Court precedent may act to bar a court of appeals from
using supervisory power. Each of these limitations will be examined in turn.
84. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); United States
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). The second of these two recent Supreme Court
cases portends what may be a dramatic shift in the Court's treatment of the
doctrine. In Payner, the Supreme Court reversed a district court's exercise of
supervisory power in suppressing evidence introduced against the defendant
which was illegally obtained from a third party. 447 U.S. at 731. Writing for
the six-member majority, Justice Powell asserted that supervisory power does not
enable federal courts to exclude evidence when the party against whom the
illegal search was conducted had no standing to challenge the search under wellestablished constitutional doctrine. Id. at 735-36. Payner, of course, may be
read narrowly as simply another attempt by the Court to limit the applicability
of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule by contracting the scope of standing.
Read broadly, however, Payner reflects a significant change in the way the
Supreme Court views the nature of supervisory power.
In Payner, for the first time, the Court characterized the use of supervisory
power to suppress evidence based on gross illegalities as "standardless discretion."
Id. at 733. The Court asserted that the exercise of supervisory power in this
context must be limited by the constitutional constraints of the exclusionary
rule-in this case, the standing doctrine-noting that otherwise it "would confer
on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of
the law it is charged with enforcing." Id. at 737. However, the Court insisted
that its "decision [did] not limit the traditional scope of the supervisory power
in any way; nor does it render the power 'superfluous.'"
Id. at 735-36 n.8.
Despite this language, the opinion seems to indicate that what appeared in the
earlier cases to be virtually limitless power will henceforth be subject to the
imposition of standards to ensure its proper application.
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A. The Definition of Supervisory Power as a Limitation
Although broad, the definition of supervisory power as embracing any decision not based on the Constitution, statutes, procedural rules, or precedent does serve to circumscribe its exercise.
When the Supreme Court renders a decision under its own supervisory power, that holding is binding precedent on the federal
court system. Thus, subsequent action by the Third Circuit based
on such a decision is not an exercise of the Third Circuit's
supervisory power.8 5 Moreover, if the court can base its decision on
the Constitution, statute, rule, or precedent, it should not exercise
supervisory power.
The Third Circuit has on occasion ignored this second
fundamental limitation. For example, in Bennerson v. Joseph,""
the court, having ordered a remand on other grounds, expressly
noted that the district judge's prior reference to a master violated
Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 7 Instead of
relying upon its interpretation of Rule 53(b) to require the district
judge to try the case, the court invoked its supervisory power to
achieve the same end.88 Similarly, in Evans v. Buchanan, 9 the
court invoked its supervisory power to issue a writ of mandamus,
setting aside an erroneous order of a district judge relating to tax
rates in a school desegregation case.9 0 Inasmuch as the court's
authority to issue the writ is statutorily based, 91 the court's reliance
on its supervisory power was meaningless at best.
The Third Circuit has also invoked its supervisory power unnecessarily in cases in which it simply had to pronounce the correct
85. The Third Circuit has noted in one case:
We are not here concerned with the question whether the rule
stated ... is one of constitutional dimension and, therefore, applicable
to state as well as federal courts ....
For it is, at the least, a rule
adopted by the Supreme Court under its supervisory power over the
courts of the United States and, thus, applicable in the courts of the
Third Federal Judicial Circuit....

Government of Virgin Islands v. Romain, 600 F.2d 435, 437 (citations omitted).
See also Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 275 n.16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1076 (1972).
86. 583 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 641-42.

88. Id. at 642.
89. 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).

The

lower court opinion is reported at 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978) (Schwartz,

J.).

90. 582 F.2d at 776-77.

91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1966).
supra.

For the text of § 1651(a) see note 44
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rule of law. In Government of Virgin Islands v. Bell, 2 the court
invoked its supervisory power as an alternative basis for decision
when the trial judge erroneously commented on the failure of a
criminal defendant to take the witness stand. 93 The court relied
on its supervisory power, although it was doing no more than
correcting a trial court's error of law. The mere fact that in so
doing the court announced a rule of general application for the
circuit did not require reliance on the court's supervisory power.
In each of these cases the Third Circuit either exercised or
intimated that it might exercise its supervisory power, when in
fact there was available a constitutional, statutory, or precedential
ground upon which the case could have been resolved.m The
problem created by these cases is not merely one of semantics. The
judicial process is based upon decisions distilled from authority,
whether it be statutory or case precedent. The unnecessary exercise of supervisory power therefore threatens the integrity of the
judicial process.
B. Separation of Powers
Although the Third Circuit has rarely articulated the separation
of powers doctrine as a limitation on its supervisory power, the
doctrine nevertheless plays an important role in restraining the
exercise of that power. The issue arises most frequently when the
court of appeals is confronted with misconduct by the executive
branch. The issue presented in such cases is whether a federal
appellate court has any supervisory authority over officers of the
executive branch. In theory, it has no such power; each branch
operates autonomously, controlling its own internal affairs. In
practice, however, the line between the two branches blurs whenever the executive branch must utilize the judiciary for enforcement purposes. It is these cases, involving judicial attempts to
deter executive branch misconduct because they arguably threaten
92. 392 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1968).
93. Id. at 209. The court's language is instructive. It stated:
Moreover, without further extending this opinion, we see no
reason for permitting a different standard to apply to proceedings in
the Virgin Islands than applies to those in other Federal and state
courts, and were it necessary to do so, we would exercise our supervisory power to forbid such comment.
94. In yet another case, United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1974), the dissent urged the court to exercise its supervisory power to dismiss
an indictment when the issue was simply one of statutory interpretation.
Specifically, the court had to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1966)
required notification of the opportunity to recant either generally or based
upon the facts of the case. 506 F.2d at 325 (Weis, J., dissenting).
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judicial integrity, which raise difficult separation of powers
questions.
The Supreme Court has frequently relied upon its obligation
to protect the integrity of judicial processes to justify what otherwise would be impermissible intrusions upon the executive branch.
In McNabb v. United States,95 the case which first articulated the
modern version of the supervisory power doctrine, the Court reversed a conviction which rested on a "flagrant disregard" of federal
law by federal officers, noting that such a conviction could not stand
"without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." 91 The Court explained that it was "not concerned with law enforcement practices except insofar as courts
themselves become instruments of law enforcement." 97
The Third Circuit has confronted this problem most frequently in the context of grand jury proceedings. Although technically a creature of the judicial branch, 98 the grand jury is for all
practical purposes under the control of the United States Attorney. 99 It is precisely the prosecutor's virtually unfettered control
over what is nominally an arm of the judicial branch which has
forced the Third Circuit to focus its attention, if only implicitly,
on the relationship of the separation of powers doctrine to the
exercise of supervisory power. The Third Circuit has held that
the dismissal of an indictment may be an appropriate remedy for
prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury 100 if a defendant
95. 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
96. Id. at 345.

97. Id. at 347. The Court expanded its use of supervisory power in subsequent cases, asserting an increasing amount of control over federal law enforcement. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956) (reversing

conviction based on the Court's "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies"). Although in its more recent opinions the Court seems to be
retreating from its expansive reliance on supervisory power, the "protection of
judicial integrity" rationale relied on in McNabb has not been wholly discarded. For example, in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), the

Court affirmed that supervisory power may be used in furthering the dual purpose of "deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity." Id. at 735 n.8.
Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion disclaiming such broad super-

visory power. Id. at 737 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Despite the Chief Justice's

disclaimer, these interests might well be served when the Court exercises super-

visory power over official misconduct which jeopardizes judicial integrity.
98. The grand jury is called into existence by the district court. See 18
U.S.C. § 3331 (1969). The district court also controls the grand jury's issuance
of process.
99. See In re Grand jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d

Cir. 1973).
100. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). The court
there noted: "[F]ederal courts have an institutional interest, independent of
their concern for the rights of the particular defendant in preserving and pro-
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suffers prejudice 101 or can demonstrate a history of flagrant and
10 2
persistent abuse of grand jury process by the executive branch.
Notwithstanding its interest in protecting the sanctity of the grand
jury, its frustration with ineffectual judicial admonishment, and
its conviction that dismissal is the only means to achieve acceptable
prosecutorial conduct before the grand jury, 0 3 the Third Circuit
has never dismissed an indictment on the basis of supervisory
04
power.
The Third Circuit has recognized that the separation of
powers doctrine cannot justify a complete prohibition of judicial
control over judicial proceedings involving the executive branch.
On a number of occasions it has reacted to perceived prosecutorial
abuse by imposing controls on grand jury proceedings. It would
be ignoring reality to deny that these controls are directed to the
executive branch in the form of the United States Attorney. It
appears that the Third Circuit has steered a middle course, attempting to protect the integrity of the grand jury while at the
same time respecting the autonomy of the executive branch. Thus,
despite its consistent refusal to dismiss indictments for prosecutorial
misconduct, it has imposed a requirement that:
[i]f the testimony of any grand jury witness or witnesses is
to be recorded, . . . all such testimony should be recorded
so that the defense and the Government will both have
available all portions of the grand jury testimony .. . [in
tecting the appearance and the reality of fair practice before the grand jury,
an interest which could justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule in a
proper case." Id. at 817.
101. See United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Bruzgo, 373
F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1967).
102. See United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980). See also United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807
(3d Cir. 1979) (entrenched or flagrant misconduct could justify dismissal of
indictment). Cf. United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977) (in
absence of evidence of violation of circuitwide practice, court would not follow
Second Circuit in adopting rule requiring dismissal of indictment for failure
to warn target of grand jury investigation).
103. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979).
104. It has, however, remanded two cases for further proceedings. See
United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). When, in the context of
law enforcement interference with a defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel, the Third Circuit did dismiss an indictment where there was no prejudice, the dismissal was promptly reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court.
See United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979) (Garth, Rosenn, 8C
Adams, JJ., dissenting from order denying petition for rehearing), rev'd, 449
U.S. 361 (1981).
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order to] prevent the recording of only those portions of
grand jury testimony helpful to the Government. 10
Similarly, the court has exercised its supervisory power to specify
the particular manner in which the relevancy and proper purpose
of a grand jury investigation shall be shown on a motion for
enforcement of a grand jury subpoena. 10 6
The court's sensitivity to the interplay of these competing considerations has manifested itself in other contexts. For example,
the court has refused to interfere with the United States Attorney's
exercise of discretion by second-guessing his decision not to grant
statutory immunity to a defense witness. 0 7 In contrast, the court
has not hesitated to exercise control over executive branch officials
operating within the exclusive province of the judiciary. Thus the
Third Circuit has directed district judges to intervene without
awaiting defense objection when the prosecutor engages in improper summation. 108
Despite its general sensitivity to the issue, the Third Circuit
has occasionally overstepped the limits imposed by the separation
of powers doctrine. For example, in United States v. Premises
Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 10 9 the court reversed the district court's
0
denial of a motion for the return of legally seized property."
The court declined to decide whether the Government's continued
retention of the property denied the petitioner due process, but
nonetheless held "that the district court under its powers to supervise the law enforcement officials and the United States Attorney
within its jurisdiction may require the return of property held
solely as evidence if the government has unreasonably delayed in
bringing a prosecution." I" Nowhere in its opinion did the court
cite authority for the existence of the asserted power to supervise
law enforcement officials and the United States Attorney.
105. United States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1974).
106. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
107. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied.
441 U.S. 913 (1979).
108. United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973).

Although the

directive was not expressly predicated upon the Third Circuit's supervisory
power, a subsequent Third Circuit decision makes clear that it was an exercise
of supervisory power. See United States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d
674, 680 n.5 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 972 (1977).
109. 584 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1978).

110. Id. at 1305.
111. Id. at 1302.
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Similarly, in Hargenrader v. Califano,"1 2 a case involving a
deserving social security disability applicant, the Third Circuit,
over a strong dissent, "promulgate[d] procedural rules for the
executive branch requiring subordinate factual foundations . . . to

support findings of fact." 113 As the dissent pointed out, a persuasive argument could be made that executive branch hearing
examiners do not come under the supervisory power of the judicial
branch. 1

4

Moreover, insofar as the Third Circuit engaged in

rulemaking for the Social Security Administration, it usurped a
power vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 115
Finally, assuming the validity of judicial action, the court's enactment did not conform either to the Judicial Conference, or to
statutory requirements for rulemaking by the judicial branch. 1 6
Despite these rare deviations, the Third Circuit cases implicating the separation of powers doctrine reflect a consistent effort by
the court to maintain the integrity of judicial processes without
hampering the operation of the co-equal branches of government.
As the following discussion of the doctrine of federalism demonstrates, the court has evidenced a similar concern for impinging
upon the prerogatives of state governments.
C. Federalism
Concepts of federalism also limit the permissible exercise of
supervisory power by an intermediate appellate court. A federal
court may not prescribe procedural rules or make policy judgments
for the states." 7 The Third Circuit's respect for the limitation
imposed by concepts of federalism can be illustrated by contrasting
the court's willingness to direct assignment of another trial judge
112. 575 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1978).
113. Id. at 438 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 438-39 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1974) provides:
The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules
and regulations and to establish procedures ... and shall ado t reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the
nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of
taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
Id.
116. See notes 143-53 and accompanying text infra.
117. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) ("We do not

establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution.").
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in the federal system I's with its refusal to do so in the context of a
state court proceeding. 119 However, the Third Circuit has not
always respected this limitation on its exercise of supervisory power.
In Conley v. Dauer120 the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania court
system had failed to provide counsel for indigents at preliminary
hearings, although required to do so by the Third Circuit's interpretation of a Supreme Court decision. 21' Frustrated by this recalcitrance, the court directed that the district court, on remand,
should fashion remedies to compel the state court system to comply
with the Third Circuit's directive. 22 The majority of the court
was apparently unconcerned by the spectre of federal court supervision of a state court system.
D. Congressional and Supreme Court Limitations
The exercise of supervisory power by intermediate appellate
courts is not only limited by doctrinal considerations. Both Congress and the Supreme Court may take direct action to impose
limits on the exercise of supervisory power. Even if a result
reached by the courts under supervisory power was not initially pre23
cluded by statute, it may be altered by congressional action.
By the same token, the Supreme Court may reverse an exercise of
supervisory power by a court of appeals. It may also decide a case
under its own supervisory power, and thus prevent lower courts
from exercising their supervisory power. Finally, the Court may
hold certain areas improper for the exercise of supervisory power,
124
as it did in United States v. Payner.
118. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
119. Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975). Although Poteet was
a case arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971), the point at issue is not covered
by that statute. The court's reluctance to order reassignment in the state
court is traceable, rather, to its recognition of the deference due to an independent court system. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text supra.
120. 463 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
Judge
Aldisert filed a vigorous dissent on the denial of a petition for rehearing en
banc. Id. at 67-70 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
121. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
122. Conley v. Dauer, 463 F.2d at 66-67.
123. United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1123 (1975).
124. 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (precluding use of supervisory power where current standing doctrine would otherwise bar a remedy for illegally obtained
evidence).
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The Third Circuit has expressly recognized that its exercise of
supervisory power is subject to limitation by congressional enactments. For example, the court has repeatedly refused to suppress
a confession as a remedy for law enforcement abuse because its
supervisory powers "are subject to the control of Congress . . .
and because . . . Congress [has] provided that '[i]f the trial judge
determines that the confession was voluntarily made, it shall be
admitted in evidence.' " 125 The court has reasoned that "once the
issue of voluntariness [is] resolved in the government's favor, the
court [lacks] any supervisory authority to suppress a statement." 12
In a similar vein, the Third Circuit has held that Congress, by
statutorily establishing the competing inducements for truthful
testimony-prosecution and recantation-has precluded the court
from ordering dismissal of a perjury indictment, pursuant to its
supervisory power,*because of the failure of the prosecutor to advise
a grand jury witness of his statutory right of recantation. 12 7 To do
so "would disturb the balance Congress has advertently established
between the competing interests of prosecution and recantation." 128
Another excellent example of the Third Circuit's deference to
congressionally enacted limitations on its exercise of supervisory
power arises in the context of federal habeas corpus review of state
court convictions. Federal habeas corpus review of state court
convictions is governed by statute. 129 The statute provides, in part,
that for individuals held in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state, relief may be predicated only on the ground that the prisoner
is in custody "in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
125. United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (3d Cir. 1974) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975), quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1969).
126. United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 985 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
127. United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623 (1970).
128. 506 F.2d at 324. The court continued:
It is the business of the legislative branch, with its superior investigative facilities, to determine how these competing inducements may
best be reconciled to produce the greatest stimulus to truthful testimony. The congressional judgment on this matter is not to be displaced by the judiciary unless there is no reasonable basis for it.
Therefore, even if we were to concede that requiring the proposed
notice would to some degree increase the incidence of recantation by
those who have testified falsely, it would be improper for us, in the
exercise of our supervisory powers, to dismiss prosecutions because of
the lack of such advice from the prosecutor, thereby endangering the
stimulus provided by the threat of criminal sanctions.
Id.
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
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the United States." 130 Thus, a decision on any other basis-such
as supervisory power-is precluded.
The Third Circuit has consistently recognized this limitation

on its invocation of supervisory power. Comparison of two cases
will serve as a graphic example of the court's restraint. In United
States v. Poole,131 a district court had refused a request to inquire
into the previous experience of the veniremen on voir dire and the
Third Circuit, relying on its supervisory power, reversed the decision. 13 2 However, in Jacobs v. Redman, 133 identical conduct by a
34
state trial court was held not to warrant habeas corpus relief.
Other areas in which the Third Circuit has noted that the exercise
of supervisory power enables it to apply different standards in a
direct appeal of a federal case from those employed in reviewing
state court convictions are the application of the exclusionary rule
resulting from illegal detention; 15 the delay between arrest and
arraignment which violates a state statute; 136 the propriety of questions on voir dire designed to elicit racial prejudice; 137 and prose138
cutorial conduct during summation.
130. Id. § 2254(a)(1).

131. 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971).
132. Id. at 1084.

133. 616 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980).
134. 616 F.2d at 1255-57, 1259.
135. See United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 433 (3d
Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 889 (1966). The Russo court

stated:

Russo and Bisignano assert that any confession made during an
illegal detention is inadmissible at trial. There is no doubt that the
detentions were illegal under New Jersey law..... and that the
Newark police force disregarded the rights secured to an arrested person under the law of New Jersey. The petitioners-appellants press
the point that the circumstances under which their confessions were
obtained transgressed the rights secured to them by the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore were inadmissible in evidence. While it is
the rule in federal prosecutions that confessions obtained in these
circumstances must be suppressed, . ... this exclusionary rule is a function of the supervisory power of the federal courts over federal prosecutions and does not rise to the dignity of a constitutional prohibition.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. See United States ex rel. Hayward v. Johnson, 508 F.2d 322 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
137. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980). But cf. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.
182, 189 (1981) (minimum constitutional requirements exist with respect to
questioning prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias).
138. See United States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d 674 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 972 (1977). The Third Circuit in Mulligan noted
that in cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971), "our review of the state
court proceedings is narrow for 'not every trial error or infirmity which might
call for application of supervisory powers correspondingly constitutes a failure
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The Third Circuit has also recognized that as an intermediate
appellate court, its ability to exercise supervisory power is limited by
Supreme Court precedent.

In addressing the defendant's con-

tention that, under the circumstances, law enforcement officials
should have employed a line-up instead of a pretrial photographic
identification, the court drove the point home, stating: "Conceding

that this would have been the ideal procedure, we nevertheless
think the Supreme Court has already implied that the substitution
of lineups for photographic procedures is neither constitutionally
required nor mandated under our supervisory power." 139
IV.

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

A. Introduction
The preceding discussion of the sources and limits of supervisory power provides some guidance in determining whether a
particular exercise of supervisory power is appropriate. Simply
stated, an intermediate appellate court may not exceed its particular function in the judicial system of correcting errors of law,
reversing erroneous findings of fact, and improving the judicial
process. Further, even if a court of appeals is acting within an area
of traditional judicial competence or performing its allocated
function, any given exercise of supervisory power may be precluded
by the limitations discussed above.
Assuming that a court has not exceeded these external limitations, the question remains as to when an appellate court can
properly exercise supervisory power. In the Third Circuit, this
question usually arises when the court engages in procedural rulemaking in areas already addressed by congressionally-approved
rules, or when the court employs procedural innovation to develop
procedural requirements or sanctions in areas not addressed by the
federal rules of procedure. 140 Two issues emerge when the court
to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.'"

Id. at 678, quoting Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974). See
also Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v.
LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973).
139. See United States v. Hall, 437 F.2d 248, 249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 976 (1971); see also United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d
739 (3d Cir. 1972). For other examples of Third Circuit recognition that its
supervisory power is precluded by the Supreme Court's exercise of supervisory
power, binding it as controlling precedent, see Government of Virgin Islands
v. Romain, 600 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1979); Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633
(3d Cir. 1978).
140. For a further explanation of the terms "procedural rulemaking" and
"procedural innovation," see note 16 supra.
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acts under these circumstances. First, has the power to make rules
in the particular context been allocated to the court of appeals or
has it been lodged elsewhere? Second, even if the power does rest
with another body, do the circumstances nevertheless require the
court of appeals to act?
The first issue is easily answered. Congress has directed that
another process or institution formulate procedural rules. 141 The
procedural arena has been preempted, and the power has been allocated to a rulemaker other than a panel of intermediate appellate
court judges. It follows that most exercises of supervisory power in
matters of procedure are invalid.
Although many of the court's exercises of supervisory power
in the procedural context are illegitimate, it does not necessarily
mean that the power should never be exercised. There are three
categories of cases involving the exercise of supervisory power over
procedural matters. First, a court of appeals cannot exercise supervisory power to require anything contrary to the federal rules, no
matter how compelling the rationale. Not only has the rulemaking
power been placed elsewhere, but the appellate court must conform
to the higher authority, and may not do anything inconsistent with
that authority.
The second category consists of those cases where the rulemaker has promulgated a rule, but there is a perceived need for
supplementation going beyond judicial interpretation. In such
circumstances, both the district court and court of appeals are
confronted with a dilemma. Presumably, they cannot supplement
the rule because the rulemaking power has been allocated to others
and a rule, although not completely satisfactory, has been promulgated. Exercises of supervisory power to supplement a rule in
such circumstances are clearly invalid. Yet to prohibit supplementation would mean a virtual end to rule experimentation and would
ultimately result in stagnation. Procedural rules which are unresponsive to the changing demands of litigation are not attractive
alternatives to invalid exercises of supervisory power. On the
other hand, rule supplementation through such an invalid exercise
can result in unanticipated, and possibly undesirable results which
would not have occurred in the absence of tampering with an
established rule. On balance, experimental rule supplementation
through the exercise of supervisory power would seem preferable.
It is essential, however, that a mechanism be developed to legit141. An explanation of the procedural rulemaking mechanism may be
found at notes 143-53 and accompanying text infra.
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imize otherwise invalid exercises of supervisory power. Such a
mechanism would not only legitimize these exercises to accomplish
rule supplementation, but also would provide a mechanism for eliminating undesirable supplements to the rules.
Finally, in the third category are those cases where the rulemaker has failed to promulgate a rule and a procedural void
results. Resort to judicial innovation is necessary to cure such a
default. Failure to act on the part of the court might deprive
litigants of procedural devices which would otherwise enhance the
judicial process. In this situation, there seems to be no alternative
but for a district judge to formulate a procedural rule which seems
appropriate, with review in the court of appeals under its supervisory power. If the district court fails to formulate a satisfactory
procedure, the court of appeals, in the course of review, must
specify an appropriate procedure. An exercise of supervisory power
in this category is legitimate if it involves a matter touching upon
the traditional competence of courts or aids the court in the discharge of its appellate function. All other exercises of supervisory
power are no more valid than in rule supplementation. The
difference between such procedural innovation and rule supplementation is simply a matter of degree. Thus, although such exercises are treated as a separate category, the mechanism proposed
to legitimize rule supplementation should also be used to legitimize
those exercises within the third category which do not involve
matters within the traditional competence of the courts or aid the
court in the discharge of its appellate function.
The key assumption underlying the preceding analytic framework is that which underlies this article, specifically that federal
courts of appeals may not exercise supervisory power unless there
is a grant of authority from some other source. This view is
predicated upon the need to identify a legitimizing source for each
exercise of supervisory power. As a consequence, in the procedural
context, most exercises of supervisory power by the Third Circuit
are illegitimate because the power to make these rules has been
placed elsewhere, and the court can usually point to no authority
which permits it to contravene, supplement, or create federal rules.
There is, however, an alternative analysis to this "narrow"
theory of appellate court supervisory power. A broader view of
supervisory power would legitimize most, but not all, exercises by
the Third Circuit. This "broad" theory does not insist upon a
rigid legitimizing source for the exercise of supervisory power.
Instead, it assumes the legitimacy of supervisory power by recog-
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nizing that courts have long been policy and law makers in the
substantive arena, and argues that such functions should apply in
the procedural arena as well. 142 In short, the broad theory envisions the use of supervisory power as simply an exercise of common law authority to fill in the interstices of procedural codes,
including the ability to formulate a procedural rule where the
rulemaker has failed to act.
The unlimited scope of common law authority is a fundamental defect in this broad view of the nature of the supervisory power.
The only limitation on the exercise of this power, beyond such
external constraints as the concepts of separation of powers and
federalism, is found in the requirement that the court show the
proper degree of deference to rules established by higher authority.
Thus, each exercise of appellate supervisory power would be valid
unless Congress or the Supreme Court, through statutes, decisions,
or formally promulgated rules, has explicitly or implicitly provided
for a contrary result. Stating the proposition exposes its weaknessshould intermediate appellate courts have virtually unbridled rulemaking power when Congress has placed that power in other
institutions?
Notwithstanding its deficiency, the broad theory of supervisory power is not without its attractions. Its principal advantages
are its simplicity, and the fact that it does not require a cumbersome mechanism to legitimize exercises of supervisory power.
Under this broad theory, courts of appeals retain a great deal of
flexibility in addressing procedural problems arising within their
respective circuits. Rather than wait for official rulemaking
through the time-consuming and many-tiered system currently in
force, the courts can act quickly and fashion specific rules to enhance the administration of justice. The appellate courts are,
therefore, free to implement policy decisions which would further
the ends desired by the rules.
Applying both theories to the cases serves as a valuable aid to
understanding the Third Circuit's approach to supervisory power.
Under either theory, Third Circuit exercise of supervisory power is
invalid when it requires a result contrary to that contemplated by
the federal rules. However, in those situations where the rulemaker has promulgated a rule, but there is a need for supplementation going beyond judicial interpretation, the choice of supervisory
power theory controls the legitimacy of the exercise of supervisory
power. Under the narrow theory of supervisory power, all such
142. See Hill, supra note 39, at 196.
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exercises are invalid because authority to supplement procedural
rules has been allocated to another rulemaker, but a legitimizing
mechanism is proposed. On the other hand, the broad theory
views most, but not all, actual or proposed rule supplementation
as valid exercises of supervisory power. Under this approach,
unless higher authority dictates otherwise, courts of appeals have
carte blanche authority to engraft anything they wish onto existing
federal rules as part of their common law function to implement
the purpose of any particular rule. Applying the two theories to
the third category of cases in which the rulemaker has failed to
exercise its power yields mixed consequences. Under the narrow
theory, such exercises are invalid unless the subject is within an
area of traditional judicial competence or in the discharge of the
court's appellate function. Under the broad theory, all such exercises of supervisory power are valid in the absence of higher
authority to which deference is required.
B. The Exercise of Supervisory Power in Procedural Contexts
Federal court rules adopted pursuant to statutorily authorized
processes are the means used to govern procedure in the federal
judicial system. It is in this area of procedure that the most subtle
supervisory power questions surface. The Third Circuit's exercise
of supervisory power in areas reserved to the statutory process has
created significant problems of legitimacy.
The process by which rules are adopted is a cumbersome one.
The responsibility for initiating such rules rests primarily with the
Judicial Conference of the United States. 148 Congress has expressly
required that the Conference "carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure"
of the federal courts, and recommend to the Supreme Court such
changes "as the Conference may deem desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination
of litigation, and the elimination of unjustified expense and delay." 144 Within the Judicial Conference, federal court rulemaking
is generally initiated by the appropriate Judicial Conference Advisory Committee, assisted by a reporter. 14 The Advisory Com143. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976). The Judicial Conference of the United
States is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and consists of the
chief judges of the twelve circuits, the chief judges of the Court of Claims and

the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and eleven district judges. Id.
144. Id.

145. See W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS 9C POSSIBILITIrs 9-11
(Federal judicial Center 1981). Advisory committees have been established for
civil, criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy rules.
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mittee considers the reporter's proposals and eventually circulates
a committee draft for public comment and possible hearings.14
This process may be repeated until the Committee is satisfied with
its product. The Advisory Committee then refers the proposed
amendments to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the judicial Conference. That Committee may accept
the proposed rule amendments as presented, may make technical
changes in the rule, or may refer it back to the Advisory Committee
for further study. 147 Ultimately, the Standing Committee determines whether the proposed amendments should be submitted to
the next decision-making body.
At this point, the proposed rule must run a statutory gauntlet
requiring three separate sequential approvals before changes, deletions, or additions become effective. First, the Judicial Conference of the United States must approve the amendments and
recommend them to the Supreme Court for its consideration. The
Supreme Court may adopt, modify, or reject the proposed rule
amendments.

48

Assuming a favorable reception, the Supreme

Court, exercising its rulemaking power,1 49 must recommend the
amendments to Congress. Finally, in most instances, the rules may
not take effect until ninety days after the Chief Justice has reported
them to Congress. 50 Congress may defer the effective date of the
proposed rules, or modify the rules, and in some instances must
expressly approve amendments.'"'
146. See id. at 16-23.

147. See id. at 25-29.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
149. Title 28, section 2071 provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the

conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress
and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court."

U.S.C. § 2071 (1976).

28

150. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976) (rules of criminal procedure to
and including verdict); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (rules of civil procedure); 28

U.S.C. § 2075 (1976) (bankruptcy rules).
evidence is 180 days.

The time period for the rules of

28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).

The Supreme Court itself may

set the effective dates for rules governing criminal procedure after verdict.
18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1976).
151. The statutory provision for rules of evidence permits either house of
Congress to disapprove such amendments during the 180-day period and
thereby prevent them from taking effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). In addition,
either house may defer an effective date or require congressional approval
before a rule can take effect. Id. Any rule addressing privilege expressly
requires such approval. Id. The statute further provides that any rule may
be amended by Act of Congress. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3
1981-82]

THE EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER

Although the rulemaking process for the federal courts is timeconsuming and cumbersome, 152 its principal advantage is that it is
designed to obtain all points of view, and is subject to the political
process. The process also legitimizes judicial supervision of procedure because it is a statutorily authorized means of establishing
that procedure.5 8 In addition, this method of adopting federal
court rules ensures uniformity of procedure in the federal judicial
system.
Independent exercises of supervisory power by twelve circuit
courts of appeals conflict with the goal of uniformity. More
fundamentally, Congress has placed the federal court rulemaking
152. For instance, the work by an Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence began in 1965. Congress adopted the evidence rules ten
years later. The revision of the criminal rules adopted in 1979 took five years
and seven months from the first circulation of drafts to its enactment. Certain
amendments to the civil rules took two years and nine months from initiation
of the process to their effective date. The most recent amendments to some
of the criminal rules took one and one-half years, but Congress deferred consideration of some amendments. See W. BROWN, supra note 145, at 60-61 and
app. The federal court rulemaking process is currently under reevaluation.
See generally id.
153. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress can control
procedure in the federal court system. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and
procedure of federal courts ....");Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632,
656 (1835) (Congress' "power to ordain and establish, carries with it the power
to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceedings in [federal] courts");
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 19 (1825) (Congress can regulate
practice of courts).
The vast majority of the commentators agree with the Supreme Court's
view. See, e.g., Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule
Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1951);
Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 905 (1976).
But cf. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1938) (legislature exceeds
constitutional power when imposing rules of procedure because such action
impinges on judicial power).
The limits of such congressional control were outlined in United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1871). In that case, Congress attempted to
force the courts to decide a factual issue as directed under threat of loss of
jurisdiction. Id. at 145. In a prior case the Supreme Court had held that a
presidential pardon was sufficient proof of loyalty for purposes of recovering
the proceeds from a government sale of private property during the Civil War.
Id. at 143. Pending the government's appeal from an adverse judgment, Congress passed an act which provided that such pardons would not be admissible
as proof of loyalty, and that acceptance without protest or disclaimer of a
pardon reciting that the recipient took part in or supported the rebellion
would be conclusive evidence of disloyalty. Id. The statute instructed the
Court of Claims and the Supreme Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
any pending claims based on such a pardon. Id. at 144. The Klein Court
invalidated the statute on the ground that in forbidding the Court to give the
effect to evidence which in its own judgment the Court believed such evidence
should have and directing it to give it a precisely contrary effect, Congress
"inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power." Id. at 147.
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power in institutions other than three member panels of appellate
judges. For this reason, a court of appeals should not exercise its
supervisory power to engage in this kind of rulemaking, and, to the
extent it does so, the exercise of supervisory power is illegitimate.
As noted above, the exercise of supervisory power in the procedural arena by the Third Circuit can be divided roughly into
three categories. The exercise or proposed exercise of supervisory
power by the Third Circuit in each of these categories will be
examined.
1. The Third Circuit's Exercise of Supervisory Power in Direct
Contravention of Federal Court Rules.
In two separate areas, the Third Circuit has exercised supervisory power to require district courts and litigants within the
circuit to conduct litigation in a manner proscribed by the federal
court rules. First, it has directed district courts to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law under circumstances in which Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 154 expressly states
that such findings are unnecessary. For example, in Coastal States
Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy,155 the Third Circuit reversed
a district court ruling which had ordered the immediate disclosure
of documents sought under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).16 6 At issue was a revised Vaughn index, 157 which the Department of Energy (DOE) had filed one day prior to a hearing on
Coastal's motion for partial judgment 5 8s The district court granted
Coastal's motion to strike the revised index, holding that DOE's
initial index was deficient, and ordered the documents released.15 "
In reversing this ruling, the Third Circuit noted that "the absence
of any factual findings in the present case renders appellate review
most difficult." 160 Recognizing that Rule 52(a) negates any obligation to make factual findings in summary judgment disposi154. For the text of Rule 52(a), see note 161 infra.

155. 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'g 495 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1980)
(Schwartz, J.).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).

157. A Vaughn index is a procedural tool developed to enable a district
court to evaluate government allegations of exemption under the FOIA and
to ensure that claimed exemptions are justified under the Act.

Coastal States

Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d at 972; see Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
158. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d at 973.
159. 495 F. Supp. at 1180.
160. Id. at 980.
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tions,16 ' the court characterized the action as an interlocutory injunction, "for which findings of fact and conclusions of law must
be set forth." 162 The court then exercised its supervisory power to
require district courts in the future "to state explicitly the legal
basis as well as the findings that are necessary to demonstrate that
the documents are exempt or disclosable under the FOIA," 16 explaining that "[a]rticulating such conclusions is, in a sense, implicit
in the statutory duty of de novo review." 164
This ruling directly contravenes Rule 52(a). 165 Presumably,
Congress was aware of Rule 52(a)'s requirement when it passed the
FOIA, yet at no time did it propose that FOIA actions of this type
not be governed by the federal rules. The Third Circuit cited no
persuasive authority in the federal rules for its action, nor could it
do so. In short, the Third Circuit's exercise of supervisory power
was in direct contradiction of the federal rules.
Second, in a series of cases beginning in 1967, the court has
directed that civil rights complaints, especially those drafted by
161. Rule 52(a) provides:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the courts shall similarly set forth the findings of fact
and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings
of the court. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear
therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on
decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except
as provided in Rule 41(b).
FED.

R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).

162. 644 F.2d at 980. The Third Circuit obfuscated the procedural posture to avoid direct contravention of Rule 52(a). After initially recognizing
the district court had before it plaintiff's "motion for partial judgment," it
proceeded to label the matter before it an interlocutory injunction. Id. at
971, 980. Seemingly as an afterthought the court noted: "It may also be a
,case not fully adjudicated on the merits' for purposes of Rule 56(d), which
similarly requires the district court 'if practicable [to] ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy.'" Id. at 980 n.54.
163. Id. at 980.
164. Id. (footnote omitted).
165. The author of the Third Circuit opinion expressly recognized "that
Rule 52(a) removes from the district judge any obligation to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law in Rule 56 summary judgment dispositions .... "
Id. at 980 (footnote omitted). Although the language is limited to summary
judgment, it can safely be assumed that the "any other motion" language of
the last sentence of Rule 52 had not gone unnoticed.
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experienced counsel, be pleaded with specificity, even though Rules
8(a)(2) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when read
together, limit the requirement of pleading with particularity to
four specific instances. 166 Rule 8(a) of the federal rules 167 directs
the implementation of the notice pleading philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a) simply states: "A pleading
which sets forth a claim for relief ...shall contain ... (2) a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... " 168 Moreover, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the only matters which
must be pleaded with particularity are fraud, mistake, and denial
of performance or occurrence of a condition precedent. 16 9 The
requirement that a complaint set forth the factual basis for an
allegation of a deprivation of a civil right in order to survive a
motion to dismiss constitutes the imposition of a particularity
requirement in direct contravention of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Third Circuit has justified this requirement as enhancing
the administration of justice within the circuit. In Rotolo v.

Borough of Charleroi,70 the court explained:
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume
of cases brought under the Civil Rights Act. A substantial

number of these cases are frivolous or should be litigated
in the State courts; they all cause defendants-public
166. See, e.g., Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978)
(complaint sufficient to give notice of claims asserted); Rotolo v. Borough of
Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (requiring district court
to provide plaintiff opportunity to amend defective complaint); Robinson v.
McCorkle, 462 F.2d Ill (3d Cir.) (upholding dismissal of complaint for mere
conclusory allegations of constitutional deprivation), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.) (requiring district
court to permit amendment of conclusory complaint), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
846 (1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967) (complaint insufficient
because broad and conclusory).
167. Rule 8(a) provides:
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-

party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in
the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
168. Id.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (c).
170. 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
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officials, policemen and citizens alike, considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is
an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and
insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and
still keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate
1
claims.' '
The dissent criticized this rationale as reflecting nothing more than
"hostility to the assertion of civil rights against authority figures," 172
and accurately characterized the majority's holding as departing
from the pleading standards of Rule 8.173

When the Third Circuit requires district courts and litigants
to eschew the rules, it has arrogated unto itself power reserved by
Congress to other institutions. Regardless of whether one begins
with an analytic framework predicated upon a broad or narrow
view of appellate court power, the conclusion is the same. The
Third Circuit has abused its supervisory power when it employs
that power to contravene the federal rules.
2. The Third Circuit's Exercise of Supervisory Power in Supplementation of Federal Court Rules
For the most part, the Third Circuit has not exercised its
supervisory power in a manner contrary to federal court rules.
In criminal matters, it has tended to supplement the federal court
rules with additional requirements. It has exercised or implicated
its supervisory power to supplement the requirements of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(1), 11, 24(a), and 32. In the civil
area, the Third Circuit has declined to exercise its supervisory
power with respect to notice in class actions under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
a. Rule 6(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Prior to the 1979 amendments, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure did not require that grand jury proceedings be recorded. 74 In four of the five districts within the Third Circuit,
171. Id. at 922, quoting Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1276 n.15 (3d
Cir. 1970).

172. Id. at 925 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id.
174. In 1979 Rule 6 was amended to include a new Rule 6(e)(1) which

requires recordation of all grand jury testimony. Rule 6(a)(1) provides:
(1) Recording of Proceedings.-All proceedings, except when the
grand jury is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically
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testimony of lay witnesses was routinely recorded, but that of
government agents was not.1 75 In the remaining district, the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, the general practice was not to
record any grand jury testimony. In 1974, five years before the
amended rules requiring recordation took effect, the Third Circuit,
in an effort to put defendants on a parity with the Government,
adopted a requirement that if any grand jury testimony was to be
recorded, all such testimony must be recorded. 170 Although it did
not mention supervisory power in supplementing the federal rules,
the Third Circuit changed the prevailing practice in the district
courts through judicial procedural rulemaking. It is noteworthy
that the court expressly stated that it did not consider it "desirable"
to require the recording of all grand jury testimony at that time
because the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference was
then considering the question. 77 As will be seen in other examples
involving supplementation of federal court rules, the persistent
question which the court has failed to address is not one of desirability, but rather one of legitimization.
b. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Third Circuit frequently has considered using its supervisory power as a method of supplementing Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Its rulings have addressed four distinct areas: 1) imposition of a prophylactic rule setting aside guilty
pleas; 2) adoption of written guilty plea forms; 3) additions to the
Rule 11 litany coupled with an oath requirement; and 4) use of
78
conditional plea agreements.1
or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional failure of
any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall
not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's
notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody
or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered
by the court in a particular case.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
175. See United States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1974).
The districts were the Districts of Delaware, New Jersey, and the Eastern and
Western Districts of Pennsylvania. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1200 n.5.
178. Conditional plea agreements are an excellent illustration of the inevitability of overlap in the classification of the varied types of exercise of
intermediate appellate court supervisory power. Because the Third Circuit has
been so active in exercising its supervisory power in connection with Rule 11,
conditional plea agreements have been categorized in this analysis as falling
within supplementation of federal court rules, rather than under the heading
of subject areas not currently addressed by Congress, although that category
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The Third Circuit has indicated that it considers Rule 11
guilty pleas to be a proper area for the exercise of supervisory
power. In United States v. Carter,17 9 the court vacated a plea
because the district court had violated Rule 11(c) by failing to
advise the defendant of his right to counsel and his right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. 8 0 In so doing, the court noted its
concern that appeals from improperly conducted Rule 11 proceedings had been filed with "disconcerting frequency." 'l Rather than
impose a prophylactic rule, the Third Circuit simply urged the
district courts to "pay particular attention to and to adhere carefully to all the requirements of Rule 11." 182 The court cautioned,
would be equally if not more appropriate.

Cf. notes 194-201 and accompanying

text infra.
179. 619 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980).
180. Id. at 294. Rule 11(c) provides:
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open
court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the
following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum
possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has
the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that
plea if it has already been made, and he has the right to be tried by a
jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not
to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a
further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere
he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask
him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he
answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence
of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution
for perjury or false statement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c).
181. 619 F.2d at 296.
182. Id. at 299. The court explained its concern:
On the one hand, a failure to properly apprise the criminal defendant
of his rights leads to an unknowing, unintelligent and involuntary
waiver. On the other hand, to the extent that improperly administered
pleas generate and encourage appeals which are time consuming, burdensome and difficult to process, the societal interests in rehabilitation,
speedy justice, swift punishment and deterrence are thwarted.
The harms caused by inexactitude and a lack of meaningful observance in implementing the rules are no longer acceptable. As we
discuss below, these are rules which the Supreme Court has promul-
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however, that "continued deviations from the provisions of Rule 11
• . . might very well require this court to take such action in the
future." 18, The court further recommended, but did not require,
the adoption of written guilty plea forms.18
The method used by the appellate court to enlist district court
compliance with Rule 11-warning of a possible prophylactic rule
in the future coupled with suggesting the desirability of written
plea agreements-cannot be faulted. 18 5 However, if the Third
Circuit were to establish a prophylactic rule or require written plea
agreements, the problem of identifying the source for a three-judge
panel's authority to supplement formal federal rules would become
apparent.
Not only has the Third Circuit hinted at the possibility of
future rulemaking, but it has actually exercised its supervisory
power to require an addendum to the Rule 11 litany. The cases
leading to the development of this addendum are instructive in
illustrating the Third Circuit's use of supervisory power. Before
the adoption and effective date of the current form of Rule 11, the
court had strongly suggested, in Paradiso v. United States, 86 that
the district court inform the defendant that plea bargaining is
approved by the court, and that the district court determine on
the record whether plea negotiations had occurred. 187 Within a
gated and which Congress has endorsed in their joint effort to regulate

and control the processing of guilty pleas.
Id. at 297.

183. Id. at 299.

184. Id. The court explained: "While at this time we do not require the
adoption of written guilty plea forms, we believe that the use of such forms
could only help in alleviating the problems which we have discussed."

Id.

185. The merits of the proposed prophylactic rule and written plea agreements are beyond the scope of this article.
186. 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973).
187. Id. at 413. The court explained:
We believe that it is appropriate at this time for the district courts
to take similar prophylactic measures to cope with this problem. In
connection with their Rule 11 inquiry on a plea of guilty, district

judges should in essence inform the defendant that plea bargaining is
specifically approved by the court and that he may truthfully inform
the court of any plea negotiations "without the slightest fear of incurring disapproval of the court."

Inquiry should also be made of counsel

for the parties as to any plea negotiations. Should inquiry reveal the
presence of plea negotiations, counsel for the parties should be required to state plainly the terms of record and the defendant should

state of record whether he understands them and concurs. The court,
of course, is not obligated to accept any recommendation or bargain

reached by the parties, and it should so inform the defendant when
any bargain is disclosed.
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year, the Third Circuit further advised the district courts in United
States v. Valenciano 18 to inform and extract from defendants during the taking of a plea certain statements which might obviate the
necessity for a post-conviction hearing under section 2255, the
federal habeas corpus provision. 8 9 Shortly thereafter, the Third
Circuit apparently made these "suggestions" mandatory. In United
States v. Hawthorne, 90 the court asserted:
Considering the increasing number of applications for
withdrawal of guilty pleas predicated on "promises,"
"representations," "predictions" and the like, allegedly
made by defense counsel to defendants, it now becomes
apparent that what we may have once considered merely
an advisable measure for Rule 11 proceedings has now
become imperative. We believe that the district courts
should place defendants under oath for the Rule 11 proceedings, and that the Paradisoand Valenciano advice and
9
disclaimers should be included as well.' '
These requirements appear nowhere in Rule 11. Finally, in a
fourth case, the Third Circuit relied upon its supervisory power
to require courts to follow the Paradiso procedure and to commit
1 92
any plea bargain to the record.

Id. Many of these suggestions have been incorporated into the current rule.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d) (voluntariness of plea); FEt. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(2)
(disclosure of plea agreements in open court).
188. 495 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1974).
189. Specifically, the court stated:
A showing in the Rule 11 plea reception proceeding may, under certain
circumstances, obviate a subsequent § 2255 hearing if the plea reception
record discloses that (1) the defendant states that no promise, representation, agreement or understanding was made or that none other
than that disclosed in open court was made to him by any person
prior to the entry of the plea, and (2) the defendant affirmatively states
that no out-of-court promise, representation, agreement or understanding required the defendant to respond untruthfully or contrary to the
terms thereof in the in-court plea reception proceedings, and (3) that
the defendant understands that he may not at a later time contend that
any promise, representation, agreement or understanding was made by
any person other than that set forth in open Court.

Id. at 587-88. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
190. 502 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1974).
191. Id. at 1188.
192. United States v. Dixon, 504 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 963 (1975). The court held: "Under our supervisory powers we therefore
instruct the district courts of this circuit that they are henceforth required to
follow the Paradiso procedure, committing any plea bargain to the record at
the time of arraignment in conjunction with the Rule 11 inquiry." Id. at 72.
As can be seen, the above language only expressly requires the Paradiso procedure, and not the other additions outlined above. As a practical matter, however, the Third Circuit addendum to the Rule 11 litany cannot be separated
from the rest of the litany.
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The objective of the Third Circuit's addendum to Rule 11(c)
and its oath requirement is the conservation of judicial and litigant
resources at the appellate level by both reducing and simplifying
the disposition of direct appeals and post-conviction relief.198 The
merits of these exercises are beyond the scope of this article, but one
troublesome point remains. As earlier noted, the Third Circuit's
solution to this vexing problem suffers from the serious drawback
of its questionable legitimacy.
Finally, the Third Circuit has exercised its supervisory power
to supplement Rule 11 to permit the taking of conditional pleas.
A conditional plea is a procedure whereby a defendant enters a
plea of guilty, 94 while at the same time preserving his right to
appeal specific pretrial determinations. The Third Circuit first
approved the conditional guilty plea procedure in 1970,195 thereby
permitting a defendant to preserve for appeal his right to question
the constitutionality of a criminal statute. 196 Four years later,
openly predicating its holding on its supervisory power, the Third
Circuit explicitly endorsed the use of this procedure when the issue
to be preserved was not a constitutional question, but rather the
applicability of a statute of limitations. 197 In 1978, the court
pushed the procedure to new frontiers by endorsing its use to
preserve challenges to six non-dispositive pretrial suppression rul193. The court in Paradiso explained its rationale: "Compliance with this
procedure should avoid ostensible claims by defendants of unfairness in the
guilty plea process and minimize the escalating number of cases complaining of
aborted plea bargains, involuntary pleas, or frustrated plea expectations."
Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d at 413. In Valenciano the court voiced its
concern with post-conviction proceedings: "While such disclaimers may not
obviate the necessity of subsequent § 2255 evidentiary hearings in all cases, it
may be prudent for defense counsel, prosecutor, or the court to elicit such
disclaimers from the defendant at the time of the reception of the guilty plea."
United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d at 588.
194. Presumably the same procedure would also be applicable to a plea of
nolo contendere.
195. United States v. D'Amato, 436 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1970).
196. Id. at 53. The defendant wished to challenge the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 1952. 436 F.2d at 53. The Third Circuit upheld the statute on
appeal. Id. at 55.
197. United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court explained:
We have not hesitated in the past to express, in the exercise of our
supervisory powers, what would best further the administration of
criminal justice within this Judicial Circuit ....
Having found neither
jurisprudential nor prudential impediment to doing so, we endorse the
use of the conditional guilty plea in appropriate circumstances; and
*we have no problem concluding that appellant properly preserved the
statute of limitations issue for review.
Id. at 852 (citation omitted).
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ings.9O
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have yet to
sanction conditional plea procedures, 19 9 and the Supreme Court has
recently noted that it "express[es] no view on the propriety of such
conditional pleas." 200
• The Third Circuit is not the only court to have grappled with
this problem. Predictably, efforts by other courts to supplement
Rule 11 have hopelessly split the circuits. 20 1 Although the merits
of the conditional plea agreement are beyond the scope of this
article, it is clear that this judicial supplementation circumvents
the statutory procedure for amending the federal rules of procedure
198. United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978). The court
stated that the rule of employing conditional pleas in appropriate circumstances
was "based on our confidence in the proper exercise of discretion by the district
judges in this circuit." Id. at 890. A vigorous dissent argued that permitting
conditional pleas under these circumstances would have the effect of permitting
interlocutory appeals to test the admissibility of evidence. Id. at 893 (Stern, J.,
dissenting).
199. New proposed Rule 1l(a)(2) of the October 1981 Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure circulated
by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference provides:
(2) Conditional pleas. With the approval of the court and the
consent of the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to appeal
from the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. If the
defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be afforded the opportunity to
withdraw his plea.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE

FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS].

200. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 363 n.1 (1981). This case,
which came from the Third Circuit and had employed the conditional plea
device, was reversed on other grounds. Id. at 367.
201. The committee which considered the rule has noted:
In the absence of specific authorization by statute or rule for
a conditional plea, the circuits have divided on the permissibility of the
practice. Two circuits have actually approved the entry of conditional

pleas, United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978); and two others have praised
the conditional plea concept, United States v. Clark, 459 F.2d 977 (8th

Cir. 1972); United States v. Dorsey, 449 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Three circuits have expressed the view that a conditional plea is
logically inconsistent and thus improper, United States v. Brown, 499

F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sepe, 472 F.2d 784, aff'd
en banc, 486 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d
937 (6th Cir. 1972); three others have determined only that conditional
pleas are not now authorized in the federal system, United States v.

Benson, 579 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Nooner, 565
F,2d 633 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173
(4th Cir. 1973); while one circuit has reserved judgment on the issue,

United States v. Warwar, 478 F.2d 1183 (1st Cir. 1973).
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 199, at 21, advisory committee note.
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and therefore must be of questionable validity even if considered
desirable.
c. Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Third Circuit has also relied upon its supervisory power
to aid district courts in establishing a procedure for conducting
voir dire. Specifically, it has engrafted onto Rule 24(a) 202 the
recommendation that individual veniremen be isolated during voir
dire to avoid contamination of the panel when there has been extensive pretrial publicity.20 3 Without addressing the desirability
202. Rule 24(a) provides:
(a) Examination. The court may permit the defendant or his
attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examina-

tion of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In
the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his attorney
and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination

by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the
prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their
attorneys as it deems proper.
FEDn. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).

203. See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972). In
Addonizio there was no question that the Third Circuit relied upon its supervisory power:
We feel impelled to add, however, that we find much merit in the
method of voir dire recommended in the American Bar Association's
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, § 3.4(a) (Approved
Draft, March 1968). As an exercise of our supervisory powers over the
district courts in this circuit, therefore, we recommend that in cases
hereafter in which there is, in the opinion of the court
a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be ineligible
to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material,
the examination of each juror with respect to his exposure shall
take place outside the presence of other chosen and prospective
jurors. * * * The questioning shall be conducted for the purpose
of determining what the prospective juror has read and heard
about the case and how his exposure has affected his attitude
towards the trial. * * *

451 F.2d at 67. In Starks, the court quoted the above language from Addonizio
but then went on to state:

In a case with serious racial and religious undertones and where the
court is facing a ten-day trial, good sense would seem to suggest that
the court adopt the practice of individual examination so that defense
counsel may be in a position to make individualized judgments with
respect to peremptory challenges. A small amount of time would be
involved, when compared With the possibility of a new trial. While on
this record we do not hold that the trial court abused its discretion,
We are able to perceive of situations in which we might so decide.
Total judicial resources will more likely be preserved by a cautious
deference to the interest of the defendants in an unbiased jury.
515 F.2d at 125 (footnote omitted).

Thus it is unclear whether the subsequent

Starks panel abandoned supervisory power as a basis for decision, relying instead
on an abuse of discretion standard.
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of this supplement to Rule 24, it must again be noted that its
legitimacy remains in doubt.
d. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 32, which governs sentence and judgment, does not require judges to explain the reasons for the sentences which they
impose. 2 °4 On at least two ocassions, one member of the Third
Circuit has urged that court to exercise its supervisory power to
supplement Rule 32 by requiring district judges within the circuit
to articulate reasons for sentences. 20 5 It is clear that he contemplates a requirement which would also formulate the type of
2°6
explanation required.
This view is noteworthy even though it has yet to command a
majority of a Third Circuit panel. The opinions cite no authority
to justify such appellate involvement in sentencing, which is a duty
currently reserved by statute and rule to the district judge. Under
existing case law, the court's review is limited to determining
whether the sentence is within the statutory maximum, unless there
is a demonstration of illegality or abuse of discretion. 20 7 Unlike the
204. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
205. See United States v. Del Piano, 593 F.2d 539, 541 (3d Cir.) (per curiam)
(Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v.
Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1130 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 917 (1978). In Bazzano, Judge Adams argued:

Although this Court was not asked by the parties to adopt a rule that
the reasons for sentences should be given in all cases, in my view, the
procedural requirement of a statement of reasons should be adopted
or future cases.
[T]he time is now ripe to require, on the basis of our supervisory
power over district courts in this Circuit, that trial judges set forth the

reasons for the sentences they impose.

United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d at 1130, 1137-38 (Adams, J., concurring)

(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

Del Piano:

He reasserted his position in

Accordingly, I write separately to urge my colleagues, once again,
to adopt a rule, pursuant to our supervisory power, that would require
trial judges to explain the reasons for the sentence being imposed, at
least when the circumstances are such that one might justifiably expect
the defendant to receive a substantially lighter or substantially heavier
sentence.
United States v. Del Piano, 593 F.2d at 541 (Adams, J., concurring).
206. See United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1138 n.44 (3d Cir. 1977)
(Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams stated: "The additional question of
what sort of explanation is required in certain circumstances is a matter worthy
of separate consideration in an appropriate case." Id. at 1138 n.44 (Adams, J.,
concurring). The merits of his proposed rule are beyond the scope of this
article.
207. Id. at 1131 (Adams, J., concurring), citing United States v. Fessler, 453
F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1972).
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other supplements to federal court rules discussed above, this particular exercise of supervisory power would enlarge the court of appeals' function and power under the rubric of that court discharging
its "responsibility to superintend the sentencing process." 208 This
enlargement of power, which would exceed the statutory function
of the appellate court, may explain why this proposal has never
claimed a panel majority.
e. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Third Circuit supplementation of federal rules generally takes
place only in the criminal area. However, the subject has surfaced
in a published opinion relating to the supplementation of Rule
23(b)(2) of the civil rules.2 9 In Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., a defendant in a class action suit urged "that if the action
is maintainable under (b)(2), [the Third Circuit] should hold
that notice should have been given prior to determination of
liability to all members of the class, ....under [its] supervisory
powers over the circuit district courts ....

,,210

After concluding

on the merits that its supervisory power should not be exercised,
the court essentially relied upon its lack of power to supplement
federal court rules. The court stated:
Rule 23 definitely does not require mandatory notice
for (b)(2) actions. By its terms, the mandatory notice
208. United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1131 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). Judge Adams explained:
[T]he principle of deferring to the discretion of a trial court clearly
does not require abdication of an appellate court's responsibility to
superintend the sentencing process. Moreover, respect for a district
court's discretion in framing the substance of sentences within statutory
limits entails no lack of power to review sentencing procedures. Indeed,
"the careful scrutiny of the judicial process by which the particular
punishment was determined" is "a necessary incident of what has
always been appropriate appellate review of criminal cases."
570 F.2d at 1131 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
209. Rule 23(b)(2) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
210. Id. at 254. Rule 23(c)(2) requires such notice to be given in actions
maintained under Rule 23(b)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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requirement of (c)(2) applies only to actions maintained
under (b)(3).
Whether the court should require notice to be
given to members of the class to make a determination [of whether a class should be maintained under
(b)(2)] or of the order embodying it, is left to the
court's discretion under subdivision (d)(2).
We will not presume to exercise supervisory powers, as
urged upon us by counsel . . . , to mandate notice which

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,promulgated by the
Supreme Court under authority from Congress, 28 U.S.C.
211
§ 2072, specifically do not require.
The rationale underlying the panel's unanimous response is both
surprising and revealing. Unlike its approach in the criminal area,
the Third Circuit apparently recognized a significant limitation on
its power to supplement federal rules of civil procedure.
f. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Third Circuit's declining to exercise its supervisory power
to supplement Rule 23 is readily contrasted with its position on
Rule 37. In a recent decision involving the exercise of its supervisory power, the Third Circuit employed its power to supplement
Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Quality
Prefabrication,Inc. v. Keating,212 the plaintiff challenged the district court's refusal to reconsider its order pursuant to Rule 37
dismissing the complaint with prejudice as a sanction for plaintiff's
failure to provide discovery, claiming that the district court abused
its discretion in dismissing the complaint. 21' Noting that the
articulation of the basis for the district court's action would
facilitate judicial review as to whether the court's discretion was
soundly exercised 2

14

the Third Circuit stated:

[E]xercising our supervisory authority over the district courts in this judicial circuit, we hold that in the
future a dismissal of a complaint with prejudice as a
Rule 37 sanction must be accompanied by some articulation
211. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,' 508 F.2d at 254 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).

212. No. 81-2567 (3d Cir., Mar. 30, 1982).
213. Id., slip op. at 2-4. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes as sanctions for failure

to comply with an order compelling discovery "[a]n order .
action or proceeding. . .' FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
214. No. 81-2567, slip op. at 6.
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on the record of the court's resolution of the factual, legal,
and discretionary issues presented 2 15
In support of its imposition of this requirement upon the district
courts, the Third Circuit stated that "[w]hen such a severe sanction
[as dismissal] is imposed, values of consistency and predictability,
reviewability, and deterrence . . . outweigh the values of economy

and efficiency that may be promoted by allowing inarticulate decisions." Although the supplementation of Rule 37(b) in this
manner may be desirable, this judicial action circumvents the
statutory procedure for amending federal rules of procedure.
Therefore, the Third Circuit's action in this matter is of questionable legitimacy.
g. Validity of Federal Rule Supplementation
The Third Circuit has frequently exercised its supervisory
power to supplement the rules of criminal procedure. Unlike an
individual district judge, who might be faced with a novel question
emerging under a rule, the court of appeals necessarily has a far
broader perspective on whether changes in substantive law and
procedural imperfections or gaps require amendment of federal
court rules. District courts, and ultimately the courts of appeals,
are among the first to become aware of inadequacies in the federal
court rules through actual experience. Moreover, the district
courts are in a prime position to perform experimental supplementation of the rules under the supervision of the appellate courts.
Furthermore, it is advantageous to have some limited experience
under a proposed supplement to a rule before engaging in the
cumbersome, time-consuming, formal rulemaking process. To do
otherwise enhances the probability of adopting a rule which will
not accomplish its objective. If the experimental supplement to a
rule proves to be unworkable, the judicial system is not saddled
with an ineffective formal federal court rule. On the other hand,
if the experience under a rule supplement is notably successful, it
should ultimately be adopted as a federal court rule with national
21
applicability.
Notwithstanding the advantages of experimental rule supplementation, the fact remains that Congress has placed federal court
215. Id., slip op. at 9.
216. Examples which come readily to mind are the advice to defendants
contained in Rule 11(c), which had its origins in experimental rule supplementation, and conditional plea agreements reflected in proposed rule of criminal procedure 1l(a)(2). For a discussion of Rule 11(c), see notes 178-93 supra
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Rule 11(a)(2), see notes 194-201
and accompanying text supra.
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rulemaking power in institutions other than a panel of appellate
judges. As a consequence, all federal court rule supplementation
accomplished under the aegis of the Third Circuit's supervisory
power is an illegitimate exercise of that power. The benefit to the
judicial process from the experimental supplementation to federal
court rules should nevertheless be preserved. The obvious answer
is to devise a mechanism to legitimize the exercise of intermediate
appellate court supervisory power in this limited area. A proposal
to further that end is set out in Section IV of this article.
If one embraces the alternative analytic framework which
presents a broad view of supervisory power, there is no need for
a legitimizing mechanism. Moreover, the alternative approach
yields dramatically different results with respect to the legitimacy of
the exercise of supervisory power to supplement procedural rules.
That approach does not treat intermediate appellate court supervisory power in terms of "power" to supplement a procedural rule,
but instead examines whether the court has accorded the proper
deference to rules established by higher authority. Under this
standard, the legitimacy of each exercise of supervisory power to
supplement formal court rules would depend upon whether the
rule supplement is contrary to statutes, rules, or decisions of the
Supreme Court.

Applying this standard, the Third Circuit's sup-

plementation of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(1)217
and 24(a) 218 would constitute legitimate exercises of its supervisory
power. Adoption of written guilty plea forms,2 19 the addendum to
the Rule 11 litany, 220 and the use of conditional plea agreements,
all in supplement of Rule 11, would also be valid exercises of its
supervisory power. Finally, the proposed requirement of having
district judges articulate the reasons for sentencing decisions would
invalidly supplement Rule 32 because such an exercise would be

contrary to the long-standing position of the Supreme Court against
2 21
appellate review of sentences.

3.

Exercise of Supervisory Power in Procedural Areas Not
Currently Addressed by Federal Court Rule (Procedural
Innovation)

As noted above, the federal court rulemaking power is vested
in Congress. That institution has delegated its power to the
217. See notes 174-77 and accompanying text supra.
218. See notes 202-03 and accompanying text supra.
219. See note 184 and accompanying text supra.
220. See notes 186-93 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 204-08 and accompanying text supra.
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Supreme Court through enabling statutes, 222 retaining the right to
accept, reject, or modify any proposed rule or amendment to existing rules. All procedural matters are potential subjects for the
exercise of the Court's rulemaking power.
When the delegated rulemaking power has not been exercised,
district and appellate courts find themselves in a difficult situation.
These cases are distinguished from those falling within category
two in that although the power to regulate procedure has been
placed elsewhere, that power has not been exercised. As a consequence, the courts' inherent power derived from congressional
intent in adopting the Court of Appeals Act-to regulate and improve the quality of the judicial process and ensure the ability to
discharge its appellate function-can legitimize certain exercises of
supervisory power. Even the rulemaker's default cannot justify
those exercises which cannot be validated by reference to congressional intent. Therefore, the remaining cases in the third category
also require a legitimizing mechanism.
A prime example of the void created by unexercised delegated
rulemaking authority is provided by reference to the procedure
followed in the imposition of a gag order. In United States v.
Schiavo,2 2 3 a divided Third Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the
issue of the procedure to be employed when issuing a gag order
directed toward non-party mass communication media during an
ongoing criminal trial. 224 The district court had issued an oral gag
order without notice or an adequate prior hearing.226 A plurality
of the court, relying upon its supervisory power to impose procedural requirements, held that
[t]he district court should have vacated the oral order, held
a prompt hearing after notice to the involved members of
the press and parties, and if a silence order was deemed to
be justified, reduced such order to writing with specific
terms and reasons and had it entered on the district court
22 6

docket.

A three-member concurring opinion eschewed grounding the decision on the court's supervisory power, arguing that such pro222. See Sibbach v. Wilson 8c Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941)
power to delegate rulemaking authority).

(Congress has

223. 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
224. 504 F.2d at 2-4.
225. Id. at 6-8.
226. Id. at 8.
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cedural requirements were mandated by constitutional considerations. 2 27

Two members of the court dissented, urging that the

appellate court could not use its supervisory power to formu late
228
procedural rules for district courts.

The general problem is now being addressed by proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure circulated
in October, 1981.229 Gag orders are specifically addressed by Pro227. Id. at 12 (Adams, J., concurring).

Judge Adams explained in his

concurring opinion:
Upon the basis of the Court's purported supervisory power, the
plurality proceeds to erect some procedural requirements that should
be met before such an order is issued. This approach is somewhat
disquieting. Appellate courts, it appears, exercise their supervisory
power over lower courts to impose procedural requirements that seem
wise, but that are not compelled by the Constitution or statute. However, a fair reading of the pertinent case law suggests that First Amendment considerations do, in fact, dictate procedural requirements like
those set forth by the majority. Thus, I would not rely in this case
on the rubric of "supervisory powers."
Id. (footnote omitted). Judges Gibbons and Garth joined in the concurring
opinion. Id. at 17.
228. Id. at 17 (Aldisert 8: Weis, JJ., dissenting). The dissent asserted:
[T]his court has no power to prescribe procedural rules for the
governance of the district courts. That power is vested, by statute,
in the Supreme Court. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072,
2075. At the very most, the suggestions of the plurality should have
been directed to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 331,
instead of incorporating them by judicial fiat in an in banc opinion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
229. Proposed Rule 43.1, a completely new rule, appears in the October
1981 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure as submitted by the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure. It provides as follows:
(a) PROCEEDINGS COVERED. Except as otherwise provided by law,
the provisions of this rule are applicable to:
(1) any portion of the trial that take place outside the presence
of the jury, if the jury has not been sequestered;
(2) any voir dire examination of prospective jurors; and
(3) any pretrial hearing.
The provisions of this rule are not applicable to bench conferences,
conferences in chambers, or matters customarily handled in camera.
(b) MOTION FOR CLOSURE. Upon a motion for closure of a proceeding or portion thereof made or consented to by any defendant on
the record, the court shall permit the parties and members of the
public and news media present and objecting to be heard. If necessary, the court may conduct all or part of the hearing on the motion
in camera. The court shall order that the public, including representatives of the news media, be excluded from the proceeding or a
portion thereof upon a finding
(1) that there is a reasonable likelihood that dissemination of information from the proceeding would interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury; and
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Should Proposed Rule 43.1 or a variation

thereof be adopted, the Third Circuit procedure established under
its supervisory power will no longer govern to the extent that it
would conflict with a procedural rule that has run the gauntlet of
the formal rulemaking process. In this case, the exercise of supervisory power permitted the adoption of an interim procedure. In
addition, the doctrine's flexibility allowed the court to avoid constitutionalizing a debatable right. Yet the absence of authority for
the court's action leaves the troublesome issue of legitimacy unresolved.
In contrast, other exercises of supervisory power by the Third
Circuit bypassing the formal rulemaking process can be legitimized
by reference to the Court of Appeals Act. For example, the Third
Circuit has used its supervisory power to establish a procedure to
be followed in enforcing grand jury subpoenas in order to achieve
the twin goals of protecting the citizenry from governmental abuse
of grand jury subpoenas and compelling compliance with valid subpoenas under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.231 In
(2) that the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness
cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative means.
The court shall make findings for the record supporting the ruling
on the motion, but in its discretion some or all of those findings may
be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(C) PARTIAL CLOSURE. Whenever the court could otherwise order
closure under subdivision (b), it may limit the persons permitted to
attend and condition such attendance upon agreement to the court's
order restricting the time at which persons in attendance may disclose
to others matters occurring at the proceeding or portion thereof partially closed. Findings supporting such ruling and order shall be made
for the record as provided in subsection (b).
(d) PUBLIC ACCESS TO RECORD. Whenever the public has been
excluded under subdivision (b) or (c) of this rule, a complete record
of the proceeding or portion thereof from which the public has been
excluded shall be kept and shall be made available to the public
following return of the verdict or at such other time as may be consistent with defendant's right to a fair trial.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 177, at L5-L7.
230. Id.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (a) (1976). Section 1826(a) provides in part:
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to
any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause
shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or provide
other information, including any book, paper, document, record,
recording or other material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such
refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his
confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing
to give such testimony or provide such information.
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enforcing a section of this Act, the Third Circuit has ruled "that the
Government [must] be required to make some preliminary showing
by affidavit that each item is at least relevant to an investigation
being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for another purpose." 232 In
a similar vein, the court exercised its supervisory power to establish
a procedure and limitation on the use of evidence in order to
permit a potential defendant to testify in opposition to an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement summons without waiving
fifth amendment rights. 2 33 Unlike gag orders, no pending amendments to the criminal rules address the procedures to be employed
with respect to either a grand jury subpoena or an IRS enforcement
summons. Those procedures established under its supervisory
power will remain the law of the Third Circuit for the foreseeable
future. However, unlike gag orders, these procedures involve a
matter within the traditional competence of courts because they
234
relate to the control of the courts' process.
Another procedure not currently addressed by a formal federal
court rule, but within an area of traditional judicial competence,
is the removal of attorneys from particular litigation. In one case,
the district court revoked the pro hac vice status of an attorney
retroactive to the date of verdict after the filing of a notice of appeal
and without any prior notice or hearing. In reversing, the Third
Circuit set forth the procedures to be used when a district court
232. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir.
1973); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 964
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). The court justified its imposition
of this requirement as "pursuant to the federal courts' supervisory power over
grand juries and pursuant to our supervisory power over civil proceedings
brought in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)." 486 F.2d at 93.
233. United States v. Waltman, 525 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1975).
234. Another recent example is the Third Circuit's resolution of a defendant's dilemma when confronted with a probation revocation hearing based
upon a pending and unresolved criminal charge. In United States v. Bazzano,
No. 81-1936 (3d Cir. July 7, 1982), the court noted that the defendant may compromise his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination if he testifies, and
may have his probation revoked if he does not testify, even though he is later
acquitted. The Third Circuit held:

"[T]he better practice is that, unless the probationer requests otherwise
or the Government shows a compelling contrary need, probation revocation proceedings should await the completion of the criminal trial resolving the substantive charges giving rise to the revocation proceeding.
If the Government insists or the district court decides that probation
revocation proceedings must be held prior to the disposition of the
criminal charges, the defendant should be given use immunity to testify
in the revocation proceeding. The determination as to the appropriate
course to follow will necessarily rest in the sound discretion of the
district court.
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seeks to revoke an attorney's pro hac vice status. 28 5 The court held

that at a minimum there should be notice and an opportunity to
respond. Except for the requirement that notice include a statement of the standard to be applied to the attorney's conduct, the
type of notice and hearing was left to the discretion of the trial
judge. 8-6 In imposing these requirements, the appellate court
noted that "some sort of procedural requirement serves a number
of salutary purposes. It ensures that the attorney's reputation and
livelihood are not unnecessarily damaged, protects the client's interest, and promotes more of an appearance of regularity in the
court's processes." 2 , 7 The court did not set forth the legal justification for its holding, but simply opined that it has "inherent
supervisory power to regulate certain procedural matters of significance." 238
Finally, the Third Circuit has occasionally employed its supervisory powers to aid in the discharge of its appellate function. For
example, in the absence of statutory authority, the court employed
its supervisory power as a basis upon which to recall its own mandate. 239

It has relied upon the same power to prescribe procedures

to be followed by the district court clerks' offices when no filing fee
for an appeal is tendered with the notice of appeal in order to allow
the court of appeals to ascertain the timeliness of the filing of a
notice of appeal. 240 These exercises of supervisory power represent
no more than a court establishing procedural rules which are in24
dispensable to the discharge of its function. 1

In summary, the Third Circuit cases involving delegated but
unexercised rulemaking power fall into two subclassifications. The
first category involves instances not within the traditional comId., slip op. at 17 (footnote omitted). Because the district court had failed to

follow this procedure, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case.

Id., slip op. at 17-18.
235. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
236. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).

237. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
238. Id.
239, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 593-94 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
240. Gould v. Members of N.J. Div. of Water Policy & Supply, 555 F.2d
340, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1977).
241. It might be argued, however, that the court's ruling in Gould impermissibly supplemented federal appellate rules. Compare Gould v. Members
of N.J. Div. of Water Policy and Supply, 555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1977) with
FED. R. App. P. 3 (appeal as of right-how taken), FED. R. App. P. 4 (appeal
as of right-when taken).
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petence of courts or in aid of the discharge of an appellate court's
function, such as gag orders. In subject matter areas falling within
this classification, a mechanism to legitimize an exercise of supervisory power establishing a procedure is urged because the concerns
raised by such exercises are identical to those present in cases involving supplementation of formal court rules. Although a failure
of the legitimizing mechanism would revive the void which
prompted judicial action in the first instance, such a void is preferable to a system which would allow individual courts of appeals
to burden litigants with idiosyncratic rules which could be abolished
only by resort to either a Supreme Court holding directly on point
or the formal rulemaking process. The second subclassification
treats matters commonly thought of as being either within the
traditional competence of courts or in aid of the discharge of an
appellate court's function. Illustrative of situations falling within
this category are enforcement of grand jury subpoenas or an IRS
summons, withdrawal of pro hac vice status, recall of a court's mandate, and the prescription of procedures for the filing of a notice of
appeal. Such exercises of supervisory power are legitimate as being
authorized by the legislation establishing the intermediate appellate
court system.

242

Under the alternative analytic framework, all exercises of
supervisory power in category three are legitimate because the
delegated rulemaking power has not been exercised. Inasmuch
as the power has not been exercised, there is no deference owing to
higher authority.
V.

THE NEED FOR A LEGITIMIZING MECHANISM

A. Introduction
If one adopts the broad theory of intermediate appellate court
supervisory power, the legitimacy of every exercise of the power is
measured against whether Congress or the Supreme Court has by
statute, decision, or formally promulgated rule explicitly or by
implication provided for a contrary result. In most instances, each
individual exercise of supervisory power will be valid since the
theory assumes the legitimacy of exercises of supervisory power by
the courts of appeals. If an isolated exercise of supervisory power is
invalid when tested against this relaxed standard, resort to a
legitimizing mechanism would be fruitless because higher authority
has already directed a contrary result.
242. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
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The simplicity of the broad analytic framework makes it attractive. However, its significant weaknesses make the narrow theory
preferable. Under this theory, an exercise of supervisory power is
valid only if the subject is within an area of traditional judicial
competence or in furtherance of the discharge of a court's appellate
function. To the extent that the Third Circuit has exercised supervisory power beyond those spheres, the exercise is illegitimate.
The Third Circuit's exercises of supervisory power and the
legitimacy of such exercises can be divided into three categories.2 43
First, supervisory power may not be legitimately exercised to contravene the formal court rules. 24 4 Second, the Third Circuit may
not supplement the federal court rules through the exercise of its
supervisory power, although benefits would be derived from the
exercise of the power in this situation. 245 Finally, the legitimacy of
the exercise of the power when the rulemaker has not promulgated
a formal court rule is dependent upon the subject matter.2 46 In
light of this analysis, a mechanism should be established to validate
those illegitimate exercises of intermediate appellate court supervisory power which do not contradict formal federal court rules.
B. Legitimizing Mechanism
This presentation of the Third Circuit's use of supervisory
power to establish and supplement procedural rules indicates the
importance of this activity to the efficient functioning of the
judiciary. Frequently, these rules address concerns which are of
pressing significance but which were not specifically treated by
Congress or by the institution established to develop the rules.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the courts of appeals exercise supervisory power in areas where Congress has already created a process
to reform the rules, they act illegitimately. The necessity for
legitimizing this form of rulemaking by the courts of appeals becomes apparent when one further considers that the federal courts
often may be the only bodies capable of perceiving a problem and
acting quickly enough to resolve it efficiently through rulemaking.
Several possibilities present themselves in response to the
dilemma of the existence of desirable but illegitimate exercises of
supervisory power to supplement federal court rules. Most ob243. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the exercise of supervisory power

in situations falling within each of the three categories, see notes 140-42 and
accompanying text supra.'
244. See notes 154-73 and accompanying text supra.
245. See notes 174-221 and accompanying text supra.
246. See notes 222-42 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

59

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3
1981-82 ]

THE

EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER

viously, one alternative is to do nothing, and simply to permit the
courts of appeals to exercise supervisory power whenever they see
fit in order to prescribe procedures for the district courts to follow.
The advantage to this alternative is that it preserves the status quo
and leaves courts of appeals with the flexibility necessary to remedy
various procedural problems which arise. There is nevertheless
a significant drawback to this alternative. The analysis of the
Third Circuit's use of supervisory power has shown that as a
doctrinal matter there is no legitimate basis for a court of appeals
to create rules through exercises of supervisory power when a
specific process for such rulemaking has been adopted by Congress.
Not only is there no authority for these assertions of supervisory
power, but in engaging in rulemaking the court of appeals seriously
impinges upon the prerogatives of the legislative branch by ignoring procedures established by Congress. For this reason, it is imperative that some action be taken to legitimize this otherwise unauthorized exercise of supervisory power.
A second alternative is to flatly preclude the courts of appeals
from engaging in procedural rulemaking. Simply put, this alternative would require that the appellate courts rule only on a case-bycase basis and not utilize supervisory power to impose additional procedural requirements. This proposal would eliminate the concern
about unwarranted use of supervisory power because rule changes
would emanate only from the bodies established to develop them.
Nevertheless, the drawbacks to this approach far outweigh the advantages. Courts of appeals would be unable to act when confronted with significant gaps in procedural rules. Often the established process for rulemaking is cumbersome, and in the interim
the burden on courts of appeals might be increased by the frequent
appeals of issues which could be addressed more efficiently by
judicial rulemaking.
Neither of the above alternatives adequately addresses the problem. One alternative simply permits appellate courts to exercise
supervisory power even when unwarranted. The other approach
prevents the courts from using supervisory power even when circumstances might indicate that it would be appropriate. What is
required is a mechanism which limits appellate exercise of supervisory power, yet retains the flexibility necessary to remedy procedural problems. Any such mechanism would require legislation.
One such mechanism might function as follows. A court of
appeals may engage in procedural rulemaking to supplement existing rules as it currently does. However, when it exercises its super-
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visory power to amend a procedural rule, that supplement will have
a limited life span. After a period of six months, if that rule has
not been adopted by the Judicial Council for the circuit, it will no
longer be in effect. If the rule is adopted by the Judicial Council,
it remains effective for a period of five years. During that time, it
will have binding effect only within the enacting circuit. If at the
end of five years no formal action has been taken to formalize the
rule through the appropriate rulemaking channels established by
Congress, the rule will expire. Therefore, the rule will retain
vitality only if adopted in accordance with statutory procedures, and
thereafter will be applicable nationally.
This proposal has several advantages over the other two alternatives. It retains discretionary power in the courts of appeals
to implement procedures when those provided have proven inadequate, without requiring the more circuitous route of following
the congressionally-mandated procedure. It enables a certain
amount of experimentation within the various circuits. On the
other hand, it furthers the interest in legitimizing these exercises
of supervisory power by requiring that a rule not be permanently
imposed until it has been adopted through the formal rulemaking
process. The proposal also ensures that these supplements to the
rules are ultimately applied uniformly nationwide, thus eliminating
the current anomaly of twelve circuits with twelve different sets of
federal rules. In addition, placing initial responsibility for review
of the rule in the Judicial Council would provide a more detailed
analysis of the proposed rule by a broader group including district
court judges as well as court of appeals judges to consider its merits,
and a more open procedure than that provided when a three-judge
panel decides to promulgate a procedural rule in the context of
an individual case.
This proposal is not without its drawbacks. Its primary disadvantage is that it renders certain holdings by the courts of appeals
temporary in effect. The possibility of confusion and disarray is
apparent. However, it is also true that all intermediate appellate
court procedural rulings are subject to reversal by the Supreme
Court or by Congress, so that they are already to some degree
"temporary." In addition, the principal advantage of this proposal
of legitimizing certain exercises of supervisory power, coupled with
its retention of speed and flexibility in the court of appeals while
maintaining congressional prerogatives, far outweighs the possible
confusion engendered by its application.
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